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This dissertation examines the economic factors that contribute to countries’ cooperation 
on multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results indicate that extensive 
economic interactions may help countries overcome potential free-riding problems and 
work together on international environmental issues. We first examine the likelihood a 
pair of countries enters into the same MEA as well as the number of MEAs they both 
share using a near universe of agreements. We then separately examine the MEAs 
dealing with pollution issues and those dealing with resource issues. At last, we examine 
how long it takes two countries to have their first agreement since 1950 and how long it 
takes them to have an additional one conditional on already having had some agreements. 
Our MEA data come from Ronal Mitchell’s International Environmental Agreements 
Database (2002-2016). 
The main results are summarized as follows. First, we find that two countries are 
more likely to have an MEA or have more of them if they are economically larger and of 
similar economic size, closer in distance, have a preferential trade agreement, and trade 
more. These results are strongest for environmental agreements between a small number 
of countries. Second, we show that these economic factors have similar effects on the 
formation of pollution related agreements and resource related ones. We also show that 
there exists a spillover effect between countries’ cooperation on these two types of 
agreements. Third, we find that economic size, distance, and trade integration variables 
shift the hazard of two countries having their first agreement as well as subsequent ones. 
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Moreover, we show that countries’ likelihood of cooperating on an additional agreement 










In recent decades, international environmental issues such as climate change, 
biodiversity, and acid rain become more and more severe and urgent. Since no single 
country can resolve such problems alone, countries often coordinate through legal 
multilateral environmental agreements. However, we observe that some countries 
cooperate on a large number of such environmental agreements while other countries 
cooperate less or never cooperate. This dissertation explores the economic factors that 
may influence countries’ coordination on multilateral environmental agreements as well 
as the timing of their coordination. Its contributions are as follows.  
 First, we are among the first to identify the economic determinants of multilateral 
environmental agreements. We find that countries’ economic size, distance, economic 
integration levels, and the common resources they share play an important role in their 
coordination on environmental agreements. We examine the environmental agreements 
based on the number of signatories they have. Our results are most robust and consistent 
for the agreements among a small number of countries.   
 Second, this dissertation sheds light on the economic determinants of the 
formation of multilateral environmental agreements as well as international agreements in 
general. In international trade literature, factors like economic size, distance, and 
economic integration levels also influence the formation of trade agreements. Our results 
indicate that these economic factors may contribute to countries’ international 
negotiations in general.   
 Third, we examine the economic determinants of environmental agreements 
dealing with pollution issues and natural resource issues separately. Basically, even 
though some economic factors have different effects on pollution agreements and 
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resource ones, most factors influence these two types of agreements in a similar way. 
Moreover, there exists spillover effect among countries’ coordination on pollution and 
resource agreements.  
 Fourth, we employ a discrete-time duration analysis to examine the timing of 
multilateral pollution agreements. We find that factors such as economic size and 
distance shift the hazard of two countries having their first agreement and the subsequent 
ones. In addition, we show that the hazard of having an additional agreement conditional 
on already having had some agreements is much higher than the hazard of having the first 
agreement.  
 The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 examines the economic factors 
that lead to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) being formed. We examine 
the likelihood a pair of countries enters into the same MEA as well as the number of 
MEAs they both share using a near universe of agreements from Ronal Mitchell’s 
International Environmental Agreements Database (2002-2016). We separately examine 
MEAs with fewer than the sample median number of signatories (26), MEAs with greater 
than the 3rd quartile number of signatories (68), and all the MEAs in the sample. Our 
approach is motivated by a hypothesis that environmental agreements with a small 
number of signatories are more likely to be initiated in order to deal with common pool 
resource issues. As such, these agreements are more likely to have binding commitments 
and, as a result, are more likely to be affected by economic determinants. Larger 
agreements, such as those signed by virtually all countries in the world, may be 
agreements largely expressing an intent and desire to deal with an issue, but embody no 
binding commitments for countries which sign them. The determinants of such 
agreements may not be economic in nature. Our results show that two countries are more 
likely to have an MEA or have more MEAs if they: 1) are economically large and of 
similar economic size, 2) are closer to each other in distance, 3) have a preferential trade 
agreement, and 4) have larger bilateral trade flows.  
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Chapter 3 separately examines the economic determinants of pollution related 
agreements and resource related agreements. Pollution related agreements mainly deal 
with pollution affecting air, land, oceans, or freshwater system. Resource related 
agreements include those dealing with natural resource, habitat, freshwater resource, 
ocean, and species. The former category addresses various forms of pollution, while the 
latter one mainly focuses on the conservation of natural resources. We find that economic 
size, distance, trade agreements, and bilateral trade flows have statistically significant 
effects on countries’ coordination on both pollution related agreements and resource 
related agreements. These results are most robust for the MEAs between a small numbers 
of countries. In addition, we find the evidence that countries’ cooperation on pollution 
agreements may contribute to their cooperation on resource agreements and vice versus.  
The last chapter employs a discrete-time duration model to explore the economic 
determinants of timing of pollution related agreements. Specifically, we examine how 
long it takes two countries to have their first agreement since 1950 and how long it takes 
them to have an additional one conditional on already having had some agreements. 
Following the method developed by Hess and Persson (2012), we employ a discrete-time 
duration model to examine the hazard of two countries’ cooperation on pollution 
agreements in the period 1950 to 2005. We focus on all the pollution agreements in our 
sample, as well as the agreements with a small number of signatories and those with a 
large number of signatories. Our results indicate that economic size, distance, and trade 
integration variables shift the hazard of two countries having their first agreement as well 
as subsequent ones. In addition, the time variable has a positive effect on the hazard 
conditional on two countries having no agreements before, but the effect changes to be 
negative if two countries already have some agreements. Furthermore, countries’ 
likelihood of cooperating on an additional agreement is much larger than the likelihood 




ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
2.1 Introduction  
In recent decades, there has been an enormous surge in the number of multilateral 
environmental agreements that countries use to address transboundary environmental 
issues they cannot resolve alone (see the first column in Figure 2.1). From 1950 to 2012 
countries negotiated over 1100 such agreements to deal with various environmental 
issues including global warming, acid rain, degradation of habitats, and overfishing 
among others (Mitchell 2002-2014). In this paper we empirically investigate the 
economic determinants of the formation of multilateral environmental agreements. 
 Previous empirical literature investigating multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) mainly focuses on factors that influence a single country’s decision to ratify a 
specific environmental treaty (see Fredrikson and Gaston, 2000; Neumayer, 2002; Egger 
et al., 2011, 2013; Millimet and Roy, 2014). General results show that countries that are 
wealthier, have a more democratic political system, and most importantly, are more open 
to trade are more likely to ratify an MEA. Our effort departs from the current literature by 
examining two countries’ cooperation on a near universe of multilateral environmental 
agreements, rather than focusing on a small number of them or focusing on a single 
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Figure 2.1 Annual count of multilateral environmental agreements
(1) All agreements (2) MEAs with fewer than the median 
number of  signatories 
(3) MEAs with greater than the 3rd 
quartile number of signatories
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We examine countries’ cooperation on solving transboundary environmental 
issues through the prism of formation of multilateral environmental agreements. 
Specifically, we ask two questions: which factors determine the likelihood of two 
countries having a multilateral environmental agreement and which factors determine the 
number of multilateral environmental agreements they share? For example, in our data  
France has ratified 213 MEAs prior to 1990. Among these agreements, France and 
Germany are both parties to 179; France and Mexico are parties to 69; and France and 
Slovakia have no common MEA at all. Instead of focusing on a single country’s MEA 
participation as done in the previous literature, we investigate why some countries 
cooperate more on environmental issues (like France and Germany) and why other 
countries cooperate less or never cooperate (like France and Mexico or France and 
Slovakia).  
We use a specification motivated by the gravity equation to explain countries’ 
cooperation on multilateral environmental agreements. We find that GDP, distance, and 
preferential trade agreements, variables that usually explain bilateral trade flows well in 
the gravity equation literature in international trade, are also good predictors of the 
probability of two countries having a multilateral environmental agreement as well as the 
number of agreements they have. Our results indicate that countries trading more with 
each other are more likely to be parties to at least one environmental agreement.  This 
might not be an intuitive result. Countries that mitigating emissions or protecting 
endangered species may incur economic losses. For example, restricting emission of 
pollutants like carbon dioxide might hurt their firms’ competitiveness in the global 
market as new regulation increases the cost of production. Moreover, cooperating on 
some environmental agreements may result in less trade between countries.  As a result, 
countries trading more with each other might avoid joining MEAs together as it may have 
a large negative effect on their trade.  
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On the other hand, it may be easier for countries to link their cooperation on 
economic policies to environmental policies when their economic interactions are large. 
Two countries can discuss environmental issues and economic issues simultaneously, 
since such linkage may sustain more cooperation on both issues (Limão, 2005). A 
country not interested in protecting the environment may be willing to do so if it can 
enjoy benefits from reduced trade barriers from its trading partners. Countries with 
extensive economic interactions have more opportunities for such linkages than countries 
with fewer interactions. In addition, countries may suffer non-environmental costs if they 
choose not to cooperate on an environmental agreement (Hoel and Schneider, 1997). For 
instance, a country might be excluded from future trade agreements if it refuses to 
cooperate on an environmental agreement. Trading partners will be more willing to 
participate in environmental treaties if the benefits they obtain, such as a decrease in 
tariffs or forming a free trade agreement, are larger than the costs they incur.  
We separately examine MEAs with a few signatories and those with a high 
number of signatories. Specifically, we examine: 1) MEAs with fewer than the sample 
median number of signatories (26); 2) MEAs with greater than the 3rd quartile number of 
signatories (68); and 3) all the MEAs in our sample. Environmental agreements in our 
data have as few as 3 and as many as 197 signatories. Figure 1 shows the temporal 
evolution of new MEAs as well as their cumulative number for the three aforementioned 
groups.   
There are two reasons that we separate MEAs based on the number of their 
signatories. First, theoretical papers exploring the formation of the multilateral 
environmental agreements predict that self-enforcing environmental agreements could 
sustain a large number of signatories only when the difference in net benefits between the 
non-cooperative and fully cooperative outcomes is very small (Barrett, 1994). A general 
rule is the smaller the actual commitment, the larger the set of participants (Sandler, 
1997). Based on this theoretical prediction, we can expect that countries often bear 
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smaller economic costs on average when they ratify large environmental treaties than 
they do when they ratify small environmental treaties. In addition, some large treaties 
such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change are signed by almost all countries 
in the world but have no specific abatement obligations. This means that countries that 
ratified them bear almost no cost at all. Since we examine factors that determine the 
likelihood of two countries having an MEA, the existence of such symbolic large treaties 
may bias our results.    
Second, small environmental agreements and large ones often deal with different 
kinds of environmental issues. Agreements with a few signatories primarily deal with 
regional environmental issues such as cross-border air pollution or overfishing in regional 
seas. Agreements with a large number of signatories often deal with global environmental 
issues such as climate change or endangered species. To be more precise, both of these 
reasons speak to the central hypothesis we investigate in this paper – that environmental 
agreements with fewer signatories are signed by countries which desire to deal with 
common pool resource issues, while larger ones are most likely what one may call 
“statement” or “preference” agreements in which countries express a desire to deal with 
an issue but make no strict commitments. With such demarcation of agreements in mind, 
economic and geographic factors are much more likely to be a driving force behind the 
formation of smaller agreements. 
We estimate our specifications annually from 1980 to 2000 allowing us to 
compare the temporal stability of the determinants. As mentioned above a country’s 
ratification of MEAs may affect its GDP, trade, and its cooperation on various trade 
agreements. All of these factors present potential endogeneity problems in estimation. To 
deal with these issues, we use the 1970 data on GDP, trade agreements, and bilateral 
trade flows, similar to the approach used by Bergstrand et al (2014). Our results show 
that two countries are more likely to have an environmental agreement as well as have 
more environmental agreements if they are economically larger and of similar economic 
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size, are closer to each other in distance, have a preferential trade agreement, and trade 
more with each other. These results are most robust and consistent over time for MEAs 
with a small number of signatories. For large treaties, the economic factors have mixed, if 
any, effects.   
Our results suggest that countries’ economic interactions may help them 
overcome potential free-riding problems to work together on transboundary 
environmental issues. In addition, since the ratification of MEAs often require countries 
to impose more stringent environmental standards, extensive economic interactions may 
also help offset the unfavorable “pollution haven effect.” 
2.2 Related Literature 
There are a large number of game-theoretic papers exploring the formation and 
characteristics of international environmental agreements. Much of this literature focuses 
on whether a stable coalition forms (Libecap, 2014). Non-cooperative game theory is a 
very popular approach (e.g. Barrett, 1994, 1997, 2001; Carraro and Siniscalo, 1993, 
1998; Hoel, 1992; Hoel and Schneider, 1997; Rubio and Ulph, 2003; Finus et al 2005). 
This literature mainly uses the concept of internal and external stability.  Internal stability 
means that no coalition member or signatory of an MEA has an incentive to leave the 
agreement to become a non-signatory. External stability means that no non-signatory 
party has an incentive to join the MEA. 
Most non-cooperative game theoretic models of MEAs draw a rather pessimistic 
picture of the prospect of successful cooperation between countries (Finus and Maus, 
2008). Basic results show that the number of countries in a stable coalition is likely to be 
very small and that self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a large 
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number of signatories may not be able to improve substantially beyond non-cooperative 
outcomes. 
A number of papers empirically investigate the formation of multilateral 
environmental agreements (Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000; Neumayer, 2002; Beron et al., 
2003; Murdoch et al, 2003; Egger et al, 2011, 2013; Millimet and Roy, 2014; Davies and 
Naughton, 2014 ). Most papers examine the role of trade liberalization in countries’ 
participation decisions. Egger et al. (2011) investigate the effect of trade liberalization on 
countries’ participation in multilateral environmental agreements. They use a linear 
feedback model to analyze the dynamics of the number of environmental agreements a 
country ratifies and construct a variable measuring trade liberalization from a non-linear 
regression model. The results show that a country will ratify more multilateral 
environmental agreements if it is economically larger and has more liberalized trade and 
investment policies. 
Davies and Naughton (2014) examine whether proximate countries have greater 
incentives to cooperate than distant ones in the presence of cross-border pollution. They 
use spatial econometrics to estimate participation in 110 international environmental 
treaties by 139 countries over 20 years. They find that the higher the treaty ratification by 
a country’s neighbors, the more treaties the country will ratify itself. In addition, their 
results are most evident in regional environmental agreements. 
Millimet and Roy (2014) examine whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have a ‘chilling 
effect’ on participation in MEAs. To consistently estimate this ‘chilling’ effect, two 
econometric issues need to be addressed: self-selection in the GATT/WTO and the 
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difficulty of actually classifying GATT/WTO. The authors use a partial identification 
approach to tackle these problems. The results show that one cannot exclude the 
possibility that GATT/WTO has no causal effect on MEA participation for the full 
sample. WTO does have a negative effect on MEA participation by less developed or 
non-OECD countries. 
Our paper is also related to the literature on formation of international trade 
agreements. There is a large body of empirical research investigating the formation of 
free trade agreements (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004; Egger and Larch, 2008; Baldwin and 
Jaimovich, 2012; Chen and Joshi, 2010; Bergstrand et al., 2014). Baier and Bergstrand 
(2004) provide one of the first systematic empirical analysis of economic determinants of 
the formation of free trade agreements. The main conclusions are that the potential 
welfare gains and the likelihood of a FTA between two countries are higher the smaller is 
the distance between the two trading partners, the more remote two continental trading 
partners are from the rest of the world, the jointly economically larger and more similar 
are the two trading partners, the greater is the difference in capital-labor endowment 
ratios between the two countries, and the smaller is the difference in capital-labor 
endowment ratios of the member countries relative to that of the ROW. 
To analyze the effect of pre-existing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on non-
members’ incentives to participate in a PTA, Egger and Larch (2008) test three 
hypotheses: (1) the formation of a PTA and its enlargement generate incentives for non-
members to join an existing PTA; (2) there are also incentives for non-members to 
establish a new PTA; (3) these interdependencies decrease with distance. By using spatial 
econometric techniques, they find significant support for their hypotheses. 
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2.3 Econometric Model 
We use two econometric methods to analyze the economic determinants of multilateral 
environmental agreements. We estimate a probit model to examine the factors which 
influence the likelihood of two countries having at least one environmental agreement. 
We then estimate an ordinary least square model to examine the factors that influence the 
number of environmental agreements they have. An observation in our data is a pair of 
countries in a given calendar year. 
The econometric framework used in the first method is the binary choice model. 
Let  denote a latent variable which is the value of a multilateral environmental 
agreement to a country. We then estimate the following regression 
(1) 
where  is a vector of explanatory variables,  is a vector of parameters, and error term 
is assumed to be independent of  and to have a standard normal distribution.  Since we 
don't observe countries’ valuation of the MEA, we define an indicator variable which is 
equal to unity if a country pair has entered into an MEA.  We expect countries to form 
MEAs if the value of the MEA is positive and not to enter into MEAs without benefits.  
We therefore define the variable  if y*>0 and zero otherwise.  We therefore 
estimate a binary choice model of the following form: 
(2) 
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, which ensures that 
 lies between 0 and 1. As we noted above, MEA is a binary variable 
which is unity if two countries jointly participate in an environmental agreement and zero 
otherwise. 
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The econometric framework used in the second method is the linear regression 
model which is shown in equation (3). The dependent variable  measures the number of 
environmental treaties that both countries have ratified, while the independent variables 
are the same as those in equation (1). 
(3) 
This specification allows us to examine the degree of environmental collaboration 
between countries instead of only examining if any collaboration exists as in the probit 
model.  For example, France and Germany entered into the first MEA in 1880 but have 
subsequently signed 301 more MEAs by 2000, whereas Thailand and Vietnam first 
entered into an MEA in 1950 but have only entered into 47 more by 2000. 
For both dependent variables, we can divide our explanatory variables into several 
groups: gravity variables, economic integration variables, and common resource 
variables. For gravity variables, we include: (1) SUM OF GDP: the sum of the logarithm 
of real GDPs of the two countries; (2) DIFFERENCE IN GDP: the absolute value of the 
difference between the logarithm of real GDPs of the two countries; (3) DISTANCE: the 
logarithm of the distance between the two countries; and (4) COMMON LANGUAGE: a 
dummy variable which is unity if the two countries have the same official language. For 
variables measuring the sum and difference of the logarithm of real GDPs we want to 
measure whether economically larger countries or countries with similar economic size 
are more likely to join multilateral environmental treaties together. After controlling for 
other variables such as distance and having a common border, economically larger 
countries might have more economic interactions with each other. If cooperation in 
environmental areas fosters cooperation in other economic areas, then larger countries 
14 
might be more willing to participate in an environmental agreement together. The 
variable distance measures the logarithm of distance in kilometers between the two 
countries. Closer countries might know each other better than remote ones because there 
might be more economic or non-economic interactions between them. This might foster 
better cooperation in the environmental arena as well. With the common language 
variable we want to test whether countries that share the same official language are more 
likely to have an environmental treaty. 
For economic integration variables, we include: (5) SUM OF IMPORTS: the sum 
of the logarithm of bilateral trade flows of two countries; and (6) TRADE 
AGREEMENT: a dummy variable which is unity if two countries have a preferential 
trade agreement. We use these two variables to measure countries’ economic integration 
levels. We expect that countries with a higher level of economic integration will be more 
likely to cooperate on solving transboundary environmental issues. In addition, when 
countries ratify trade agreements, they not only decrease tariffs but also increase 
cooperation in other areas, like the protection of the environment. Trade policy 
negotiations have been increasingly accompanied by environmental policy measures 
(Baghdadi, 2013). So we might expect countries with trade agreements are more likely to 
have environmental agreements with each other. 
For common resources variables, we include: (7) BORDER LENGTH: equal to 
logarithm of (1+length of common border of two countries); (8) SAME REGION: a 
dummy variable equal to one if the two countries are in the same geographic region; and 
(9) NEIGHBOR REGION: a dummy variable equal to one if the two countries are 
located in neighboring geographic regions. Since the MEAs with a few signatories are 
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primarily used to resolve regional environmental issues, controlling for these variables 
helps better identify the effects of economic factors on countries’ MEA cooperation. 
We estimate cross-section regressions annually from 1980 to 2000. As mentioned 
above, countries’ cooperation on international environmental issues might foster their 
economic exchange such as asset cross-holdings and might also impede their bilateral 
trade flows. To deal with this potential endogeneity issue, we use the 1970 data on GDP 
variables, bilateral trade flows, and trade agreement dummy. 
2.4 Data 
Multilateral environmental agreement data are from Ronald Mitchell’s International 
Environmental Agreement Database Project (2002-2015). Basic information on 
multilateral environmental agreements includes subject or topic of the agreement, its 
beginning date, and membership. Treaties are categorized into eight subjects: energy, 
freshwater resources, habitat, nature, oceans, weapons and environment, pollution, and 
species. In addition, agreements dealing with pollution are further divided into four 
categories: pollution related to air, land, ocean, and waste. Agreements dealing with 
species are also divided into four categories: agriculture, birds, fish, and mammals. 
Member countries and the date when those members ratified the agreement are identified 
in the database. 
There are 1,119 agreements, including original agreements, protocols and 
amendments, from 1950 to 2012. Countries generally use original agreements to reach 
major new environmental objectives, use protocols for new but related environmental 
goals, and use amendments for minor modifications to those existing agreements. While 
one could exclude those modifications, this will understate the number of significant 
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multilateral environmental agreements (Mitchell, 2003). Indeed, there are a number of 
important protocols and amendments in our data set, such as the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the amendment to the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. On the other hand, including all modifications 
might include some minor, noncontroversial, or technical amendments (Mitchell, 2003). 
In our paper, we use the broad definition and do not distinguish between these three types 
of agreements. 
Bilateral trade flow data are aggregated from 4-digit SITC UN Comtrade data. 
Gravity data are from the CEPII gravity database. Economic integration agreement data 
are from Baier and Bergstrand (2007).  Data for the length of common border come from 
Wikipedia. 
2.5 Results 
We begin by comparing the results using MEAs with fewer than the median number of 
signatories (26), MEAs with greater than the 3rd quartile number of signatories (68), and 
all MEAs respectively for the year 1990. This gives us a general idea about how 
economic factors affect countries’ cooperation on various agreements in a given year. We 
then proceed estimate our specifications annually from 1980 to 2000 and plot the 
coefficients of each explanatory variable over time first using small agreements, followed 
by large agreements and all agreements. 
Previewing our results, economic size, distance, and economic integration 
variables can successfully explain countries’ cooperation on MEAs with fewer than 26 
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signatories, the median number. These factors have mixed effects in different years for 
MEAs with more than 68 signatories, the 3rd quartile of signatories and for all MEAs.  
2.5.1 Economic determinants of small MEAs, large MEAs, and all MEAs for year 
1990 
In Table 2.1, we present the marginal effects for the likelihood of two countries having an 
environmental agreement in 1990. Our dependent variable here is dichotomous and is 
equal to one if two countries have an environmental agreement in a given year and zero 
otherwise. In addition, we report marginal effects evaluated at means of independent 
variables on the probabilities of two countries having an environmental agreement. 
Table 2.1 The likelihood of two countries having an MEA 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES small agreements large agreements all agreements 
SUM OF GDP 0.0252*** -0.00303*** -0.00354*** 
(0.00129) (0.000987) (0.000892) 
DIFFERENCE IN GDP -0.0136*** 0.000835 0.000326 
(0.00185) (0.00135) (0.00117) 
SUM OF IMPORT 0.00294*** 0.00447*** 0.00352*** 
(0.000292) (0.000324) (0.000290) 
DISTANCE -0.0570*** -0.00470 -0.0152*** 
(0.00622) (0.00550) (0.00485) 
BORDER LENGTH 0.00695** 0.00389 0.00231 
(0.00310) (0.00407) (0.00416) 
COMON LANGUAGE 0.0651*** -0.0244*** -0.0245*** 
(0.00737) (0.00672) (0.00590) 
SAME REGION 0.198*** 0.00311 0.0165* 
(0.0117) (0.0103) (0.00948) 
NEIGHBOR REGION 0.103*** 0.0132 -0.00586 
(0.0105) (0.0102) (0.00852) 
TRADE AGREEMENT 0.0473*** 0.106*** 0.0958*** 
(0.0145) (0.0329) (0.0364) 
Observations 9,216 9,216 9,216 
(1) Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(2) All results we present are marginal effects. We use 1970 data on GDP, trade flows, and trade 
agreements and run regressions for 1990 
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The first column refers to the results using MEAs with fewer than 26 signatories, 
the median number. For economic size variables, the sum of logged GDPs has a positive 
effect indicating that economically large countries are more likely to have a small MEA.  
If we increase the product of two countries’ real GDPs by 10% (since the independent 
variable is the sum of the logged GDPs), the probability of them having an environmental 
agreement increases by about 0.2%. This effect becomes more evident if we compare 
across country pairs. For example, in 1990, the product of France and Germany’s real 
GDPs is about 4400 times of that of Vietnam and Thailand’s. This increases the former 
pair of countries’ probability of having an MEA by about 21% compared with the latter 
pair holding other things equal. The difference in logged GDPs has a negative effect 
indicating that countries with similar economic sizes are more likely to have a small 
MEA. 
Countries trading more with each other are more likely to have an agreement with 
a small number of signatories. The marginal effect is significant and positive. As 
mentioned above, trade agreements do not just eliminate trade barriers, they may also 
foster countries’ environmental cooperation.1 Our results support this assertion. Countries 
with a trade agreement are more likely to have an environmental agreement. In 1990 
trade agreements tend to increase the probability of two countries having an 
environmental agreement by about 5%. 
1 For example, when signing the North American Free Trade Agreement, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. 
also signed a side agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation which 
stipulated that each country must enforce its environmental laws and created a dispute settlement 
mechanism for enforcement purposes. 
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 If two countries are close to each other, they are more likely to have an 
agreement. This result is reasonable because MEAs with a few signatories often deal with 
regional environmental issues and only nearby countries need to cooperate. In addition, 
since closer countries might know each other better than remote ones, they are more 
likely to cooperate on environmental issues. Similarly, countries sharing a longer 
common border, located within the same region as well as neighboring regions are more 
likely to have such an agreement. Countries with a longer common border may share 
more common resources together, making them more likely to work together on solving 
transboundary environmental problems.  In addition, countries with the same common 
official language are also more likely to have an agreement. Results in the first column 
indicate that economic size, distance, and economic integration variables contribute to 
countries’ cooperation on MEAs with a few signatories. 
The second and third columns in Table 2.1 present the results using MEAs with a 
large number of signatories (68 to be precise) and all MEAs respectively. As we argued 
above, the results using large agreements and all agreements may be inconclusive. Large 
environmental agreements often have small effects. In addition, some large agreements 
are signed by almost every country in the world but have no specific binding targets. If 
there are few economic costs to joining a large agreement, every country will do that. 
This kind of cooperation may lack economic driving forces. As a result, our economic 
determinants may not work well in explaining countries’ cooperation on large MEAs. 
As we expect, in column 2, most of our variables of interest have no statistically 
significant effects or have counter intuitive effects like the sum of logged GDPs. The 
only exceptions are economic integration variables. Countries with trade agreements or 
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those having larger bilateral trade flows are more likely to be parties to a large agreement 
which likely speaks to the fact that more open economies are more likely to cooperate on 
environmental issues. Similar results are also shown in column 3 in which we examine all 
agreements. 
We show our results on factors influencing the number of MEAs two countries 
have in 1990 in Table 2.2. Similar to Table 2.1, we present the results using MEAs with a 
few signatories, MEAs with many signatories, and all MEAs from column 1 to 3. 
Table 2.2 The number of MEAs two countries have 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES small agreements large agreements all agreements 
SUM OF GDP 0.121*** 1.567*** 2.185*** 
(0.00887) (0.0777) (0.0916) 
DIFFERENCE IN GDP -0.0978*** -0.243** -0.663*** 
(0.00914) (0.102) (0.115) 
SUM OF IMPORT 0.0367*** 0.370*** 0.531*** 
(0.00281) (0.0207) (0.0267) 
DISTANCE -0.342*** 1.625*** -1.052*** 
(0.0522) (0.273) (0.372) 
BORDER LENGTH 0.268*** 0.0739 -0.0365 
(0.0616) (0.228) (0.358) 
COMON LANGUAGE 0.0330 -1.163*** -2.722*** 
(0.0576) (0.360) (0.470) 
SAME REGION 1.186*** 4.585*** 8.851*** 
(0.0932) (0.535) (0.784) 
NEIGHBOR REGION -0.148** 1.718*** 3.312*** 
(0.0711) (0.515) (0.664) 
TRADE AGREEMENT 1.605*** 4.418*** 10.37*** 
(0.277) (1.172) (1.866) 
Observations 9,216 9,216 9,216 
(1) Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(2) We use 1970 data on GDP, trade flows, and trade agreements and run regressions for 1990 
For small MEAs, economic size, distance, and economic integration variables 
have similar effects in explaining the number of agreements two countries have as they 
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do in explaining the likelihood of two countries having an agreement. Specifically, 
economically large countries and those with similar economic sizes, those close to each 
other, and those with trade agreements and having larger bilateral trade flows tend to 
have more environmental agreements with a few signatories.  
For large MEAs, most of our variables of interest work well in explaining the 
number of MEAs. The reasons are as follows. In probit estimation two countries with one 
hundred environmental agreements are treated the same as those having only one 
environmental agreement. There are some large environmental agreements that most 
countries in the world have ratified. Many countries join such agreements because they 
do not need to bear many or any costs as these agreements do not have binding 
commitments. This may bias our results since we treat as equal country pairs which 
cooperate a lot and those that cooperate much less. We solve this problem by focusing on 
small agreements only. In OLS estimation, we compare the number of environmental 
agreements two countries have. To some extent, this may alleviate some problems caused 
by large treaties that include almost every country.  However, there are some systematic 
differences between large environmental agreements and small ones. A better way to 
minimize the bias is to treat these two types of agreements separately in estimation.  
2.5.2 Economic determinants of small MEAs, large MEAs, and all MEAs from 
1980 to 2000 
Figure 2 present the results on economic determinants of the likelihood of two 
countries having a small environmental agreement. Figure 3 show the results on the 
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Figure 2.3 OLS results using MEAs with fewer than the median number of signatories
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In Figure 2.2, we plot the marginal effect and a 95% confidence interval of each 
explanatory variable year by year from 1980 to 2000. We use the 1970 data on GDPs, 
trade flows, and trade agreement variables in each of our estimations. Compared to the 
results shown in the first column in Table 1, these graphs examine the temporal stability 
of each determinant. As we can see, the effects of most explanatory variables are rather 
stable over time. Our results show that two countries are more likely to have an 
environmental agreement with a few signatories if they are economically large and are of 
similar economic size, if they are close in distance, if they have a trade agreement, and if 
their bilateral trade flows are large. These effects are statistically significant over time. 
In Figure 2.3, we plot similar graphs on factors determining the number of 
environmental agreements two countries have. Most determinants have statistically 
significant and consistent effects over time. Our results show that economic size, bilateral 
distance, and economic integration variables have similar effects on the number of 
environmental agreements as they do on the likelihood of having an agreement. 
We then investigate countries’ cooperation on MEAs with more than 68 
signatories and all MEAs in our sample. Figure 2.4 presents the results on the probability  
two countries having an agreement with a large number of signatories. Economic size 
variables have mixed effects over time. The sum of logged GDPs has a positive effect in 
the early 1980s and after 1992 but has a negative effect in other years. The difference in 
logged GDPs also has mixed results over time and the estimates are statistically 
insignificantly different from zero in most years. Distance has a negative effect over time 
with the effect insignificant in early years. Trade agreements and bilateral trade have 
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Figure 2.7 OLS results using all MEAs 
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Figure 2.5 presents the results on the number of MEAs two countries have using 
agreements with many signatories. The difference in logged GDPs has a mixed effect 
over time and the coefficient is not significant in many years. Distance has a positive 
significant effect over time which means that close countries have fewer large 
environmental agreements than remote ones. This is not at all surprising since in 
agreements with many signatories, many bilateral pairs of countries will be far apart. The 
sum of logged GDPs, existence of a trade agreement, and bilateral trade flow all have 
positive and statistically significant effects over time.  
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show our results for the likelihood of two countries having 
an agreement and the number of agreements two countries have respectively for all 
MEAs in our sample. These results show how our independent variables work if we do 
not separate the small agreements from the large agreements. Similar to the results for 
large agreements, economic factors perform poorly in explaining the likelihood of two 
countries having an MEA. On the other hand, economic size, distance, and economic 
integration variables work well in the OLS regression which examines the number of 
MEAs two countries have. 
2.6 Robustness 
We implement several robustness tests to check the sensitivity of our results. We first 
examine various alternative specifications in Table 2.3.We only use small agreements 
which are most interesting and repeat our regressions for year 1990. Then in Figure 2.8 
and 2.9 we extend our results for a longer period from 1965 to 2000 and see how our 
explanatory variables work in early years. 
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In Table 2.3, we present our results using alternative specifications. As before, we 
use 1970 data on GDPs, trade flows, and trade agreement variables. There are two panels 
in this table. Panel A (from column 1 to column 4) examines the likelihood of two 
countries having an environmental agreement. Panel B (from column 5 to column 10) 
examines the number of environmental agreements two countries have. For the first 
panel, column 1 is the baseline result which is the same as the first column in Table 1. In 
column 2, we exclude all potential endogenous variables and use only geographic ones. 
These variables have similar effects with those in column 1. In column 3, we exclude 
trade agreement and trade flow variables and in column 4 we only exclude trade flows. 
This accounts for the potential concerns that gravity variables may affect countries’ 
participation in preferential trade agreements and bilateral trade flows. As we can see, 
estimates in columns 3 and 4 have similar signs and magnitudes with those in the 
baseline result.  For the second panel, column 5 presents the baseline result which is the 
same as the first column in Table 2. In the following three columns, we estimate OLS 
models using similar specifications as those from columns 2 to 4. Our estimates are 
similar to the baseline result. In columns 9 and 10, we employ Poisson and negative 
binomial estimators to deal with the count nature of our dependent variables. All 
explanatory variables still have similar effects. 
In Figures 2.8 and 2.9, we present the probit results and OLS results from 1965 
to 2000 using MEAs with less than the median number of signatories and employing our 
benchmark specifications given by equations (1) and (3). To obtain results in early years 
(before 1980), we have to use explanatory variables in their current-year values since 
information on GDP and trade flows is missing for many of the earlier years. We 
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compare the results from using current-year values to those using 1970 values by plotting 
both sets of coefficients in the same figure. Most variables have similar effects when we 
use their current-year values in estimation. As we can see, most variables of interest have 
similar effects in the early years.  
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Table 3 Alternative Specifications 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 























SUM OF GDP 0.0252*** 0.0296*** 0.0324*** 0.121*** 0.196*** 0.199*** 0.247*** 0.301*** 
(0.00129) (0.00102) (0.00116) (0.00887) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0123) (0.0118) 
DIFFERENCE IN GDP -0.0136*** -0.0108*** -0.0133*** -0.0978*** -0.0746*** -0.0967*** -0.124*** -0.157*** 
(0.00185) (0.00161) (0.00184) (0.00914) (0.00770) (0.00919) (0.0179) (0.0216) 
SUM OF IMPORT 0.00294*** 0.0367*** 0.0281*** 0.0330*** 
(0.000292) (0.00281) (0.00238) (0.00302) 
DISTANCE -0.0570*** -0.0341*** -0.0654*** -0.0652*** -0.342*** -0.259*** -0.491*** -0.436*** -0.330*** -0.637*** 
(0.00622) (0.00258) (0.00554) (0.00626) (0.0522) (0.0261) (0.0536) (0.0551) (0.0515) (0.0703) 
BORDER LENGTH 0.00695** 0.0101*** 0.00557** 0.00542* 0.268*** 0.329*** 0.309*** 0.257*** -0.0104 0.00579 
(0.00310) (0.00144) (0.00280) (0.00319) (0.0616) (0.0506) (0.0630) (0.0628) (0.0159) (0.0208) 
COMON LANGUAGE 0.0651*** 0.0372*** 0.0697*** 0.0712*** 0.0330 0.102*** 0.212*** 0.110* 0.523*** 0.739*** 
(0.00737) (0.00324) (0.00648) (0.00738) (0.0576) (0.0268) (0.0504) (0.0572) (0.0772) (0.0718) 
SAME REGION 0.198*** 0.0825*** 0.174*** 0.198*** 1.186*** 0.664*** 1.207*** 1.185*** 1.417*** 1.473*** 
(0.0117) (0.00509) (0.0106) (0.0118) (0.0932) (0.0531) (0.0978) (0.0969) (0.104) (0.127) 
NEIGHBOR REGION 0.103*** 0.0446*** 0.0757*** 0.0958*** -0.148** -0.138*** -0.355*** -0.221*** 0.499*** 0.456*** 
(0.0105) (0.00474) (0.00938) (0.0106) (0.0711) (0.0356) (0.0736) (0.0735) (0.0955) (0.118) 
TRADE AGREEMENT 0.0473*** 0.0676*** 1.605*** 1.862*** 0.186** 0.234* 
(0.0145) (0.0142) (0.277) (0.285) (0.0887) (0.129) 
Observations 9,216 22,791 10,153 9,216 9,216 22,791 10,153 9,216 9,216 9,216 
R-squared 0.316 0.121 0.262 0.291 
ln(\alpha) 0.744*** 
(0.0667) 
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In this chapter, we employ a gravity type model to examine the economic factors that 
determine countries’ cooperation on multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). We 
separately examine MEAs with fewer than the sample median number of signatories (26), 
MEAs with greater than the 3rd quartile number of signatories (68), and all the MEAs in 
the sample. Our approach is motivated by a hypothesis that environmental agreements 
with a small number of signatories are more likely to be initiated in order to deal with 
transboundary environmental issues and common pool resource issues. As such, these 
agreements are more likely to have binding commitments and, as a result, are more likely 
to be affected by economic determinants. Larger agreements, such as those signed by 
virtually all countries in the world, may be agreements largely expressing an intent and 
desire to deal with an issue, but embody no binding commitments for countries which 
sign them. The determinants of such agreements may not be economic in nature. 
Our results show that two countries are more likely to have an MEA or have more 
MEAs if they: 1) are economically large and of similar economic size, 2) are closer to 
each other in distance, 3) have a preferential trade agreement, and 4) have larger bilateral 
trade flows. The results suggest that countries’ economic interactions may help them 
overcome potential free-riding problems to work together on transboundary 
environmental issues. In addition, since the ratification of MEAs often require countries 
to impose more stringent environmental standards, extensive economic interactions may 






ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF POLLUTION AND RESOURCE 
AGREEMENTS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Countries can implement domestic policies to deal with environmental externalities 
happening within their borders. However, many of the most urgent environmental issues 
nowadays are international in nature and can only be solved through countries’ 
cooperation. Some examples include climate change, acid rain, loss of biodiversity, and 
ocean pollution. To address such problems, countries often adopt multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs).  
One major problem that prevents countries’ collective action on solving 
international environmental issues is free riding.  Theoretical research suggests that a 
self-enforcing MEA can only support a few signatories and MEAs with a large number of 
signatory countries can hardly achieve more than what individual countries would do 
without MEAs (e.g. Barrett, 1994, 1997, 2001; Carraro and Siniscalo, 1993, 1998; Hoel, 
1992; Hoel and Schneider, 1997). In spite of such pessimistic views, some empirical 
papers find that trade openness may contribute to countries’ MEA membership 
(Neumayer, 2002; Egger et al, 2011, 2013). In addition, Sigman (2004) examines the 
relationship between bilateral trade and transboundary pollution among trading partners. 
She shows that countries with more extensive trade have lower pollution in rivers they 
share than other countries. Besedes et al. (2016) examine the economic determinants of 
countries’ cooperation on MEAs and their results suggest that countries having more 
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economic interaction are more likely to cooperate on multilateral environmental 
agreements.  
To distinguish from previous research, we examine the economic determinants of 
MEAs across different environmental issues. We focus on pollution related agreements 
and resource related agreements separately. In addition, we examine whether there are 
any spillover effects between countries’ coordination on these two types of agreements. 
There are several differences between the two types of agreements. First, pollution 
agreements address various forms of pollution, while resource agreements focus on the 
conservation or management of natural resources. In line with the classification in Ronald 
Mitchell’s IEA database (2016) pollution related agreements include agreements dealing 
with air pollution, land pollution, marine pollution, and waste pollution. Resource related 
agreements include those dealing with natural resource, habitat, freshwater resource, 
ocean, and species. 
Second, the number of resource agreements are much larger than that of pollution 
ones. In addition, countries’ cooperation on international pollution issues is a relatively 
new phenomenon compared to their cooperation on resource issues. The number of 
pollution and resource agreements over time is shown in Figure 2.1. The top panel of 
Figure 1 shows the number of new pollution agreements and resource agreements from 
1950 to 2010, and the bottom panel of Figure 2.1 shows the cumulative number of both 
types of agreements for the same period. As shown in the figures, there are less than 100 
pollution agreements in 2000 and the number of resource agreements is almost 5 times of 
that. In addition, most pollution agreements are adopted after 1970 which indicates that 
such agreements are a rather new development. We observe a relatively large number of 
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such agreements formed in the late 1970s and from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. On 
the other side, MEAs dealing with resource issues date back to 1800s and they account 
for the majority of MEAs before 1970. We also observe a dramatic surge in the number 
of such agreements from early 1990s to early 2000s. Third, pollution agreements tend to 
have a larger number of signatories than resource agreements do. The median number of 
signatories of pollution agreements is 36, while the median of resource agreements is 
only 10. The reasons stated above make it worthwhile to separately examine the 
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The agreement in this paper refers to any original agreement or protocol. 
Countries generally sign agreements to pursue major new policy objectives and employ 
protocols for new but related policy goals (Mitchell, 2003). For example, countries 
employ the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) as well as 
its eight protocols, such as 1985 Helsinki Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur 
Emissions, to deal with transboundary air pollution. We do not include any amendment in 
our analysis.  
 We employ four econometric models to explore the economic factors that 
influence countries’ cooperation on pollution agreements and resource agreements. First, 
we estimate a probit model to examine the likelihood of two countries’ cooperation on 
environmental agreements and we estimate an ordinary least square model to examine the 
number of agreements two countries have. These models allow us to examine if any 
environmental collaboration exists between countries as well as the degree of such 
collaboration. We estimate these models year by year from 1980 to 2000 which allows us 
to examine how the effects of the economic factors change over time. To deal with 
potential endogeneity issues, we use 1970 data on GDPs, trade agreements, and bilateral 
trade flows.  
Second, we estimate two linear dynamic panel-data models to examine the 
number of agreements two countries have following the methods developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in which the 
lagged dependent variables are used as explanatory variables. The Arellano-Bond model 
employs the generalized method of moments (GMM) and uses the lagged levels of the 
dependent variable and first differences of the exogenous variables as instruments for the 
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first-differenced equation. On the other hand, Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond model uses 
moment conditions in which lagged first differences of the dependent variable are 
instruments for the level equation as well as the moment conditions used in Arellano-
Bond method. We estimate these two models by using the data from 1960 to 2005.  
 There are 588 MEAs, 92 pollution agreements and 496 resource agreements, 
among 140 countries in the period from 1960 to 2005. The results show that economic 
size, distance, and economic integration levels matter for countries’ collaboration on both 
pollution related and resource related agreements. Specifically, we show that two 
countries are more likely to have an environmental agreement or have more of them if: 1) 
they are economically larger and of similar economic size, 2) are closer in distance, 3) 
have a preferential trade agreement, and 4) trade more with each other. The results are 
most robust for agreements among a relatively small number of countries. In addition, we 
find evidence that there exist spillover effects between countries’ coordination on 
pollution and resource agreements. Countries with more pollution agreements tend to 
cooperate on more resource agreements and vice versa.  
3.2 Economic Determinants of MEA Cooperation 
In this section, we examine three sets of economic factors which may contribute to 
countries’ collaboration on multilateral environmental agreements. Following Besedes et 
al. (2016), we include gravity variables, common resource variables, and economic 
integration variables.  
 As for gravity variables, we include (1) SUM OF GDP: the sum of the logarithm 
of real GDPs of the two countries; and (2) DIFFERENCE IN GDP: the absolute value of 
the difference between the logarithm of real GDPs of the two countries. We use these two 
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variables to examine whether economically larger countries or countries with similar size 
are more likely to cooperate on pollution agreements and resource agreements. 
Economically larger countries may interact more economically with each other after 
controlling for other factors. Countries with more economic interactions may have more 
opportunities for “issue linkage”. We also include (3) DISTANCE: the logarithm of the 
distance between two countries’ economic centers; and (4) COMMON LANGUAGE: a 
dummy variable equal to one if the two countries have the same official language. Closer 
countries may have more economic exchanges. Furthermore, these countries may also 
share similar culture or history which may promote their environmental coordination. We 
collect our GDP, distance, and common language data from the CEPII gravity database.  
 As for variables which proxy for common resources, we include: (5) BORDER 
LENGTH: logarithm of (1+length of common border of two countries); (6) SAME 
REGION: a dummy variable equal to one if the two countries are in the same 
geographical region; and (7) NEIGHBOR REGION: a dummy variable equal to one if 
the two countries are located in neighboring geographical regions. We assume that 
countries with longer common border or within the same region are more likely to share 
some common resources such as a lake or river basin. These countries may have more 
opportunities to incur transboundary environmental issues. After controlling for these 
variables we can better identify the effects of economic factors. Border length data are 
provided by the CIA World Factbook. The information about geographical regions is 
provided by United Nations’ country grouping. Countries in the world are divided into 13 
regions: North America, Caribbean, Central America, South America, Western Europe, 
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Eastern Europe, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, South Asia, Central 
Asia, East Asia, and Oceania.  
 As for economic integration variables, we include: (8) SUM OF IMPORTS: the 
sum of the logarithm of bilateral trade flows of two countries; and (9) TRADE 
AGREEMENT: a dummy variable which is unity if two countries have a preferential 
trade agreement. We expect that countries are more likely to cooperate on MEAs if they 
have a higher economic integration level. Bilateral trade flow data are aggregated from 4-
digit SITC UN Comtrade data. Data on trade agreements are from the Database on 
Economic Integration Agreements compiled by Scott Baier and Jeff rey Bergstrand 
(2007).  
3.3 Econometric Models 
We employ four econometric models to examine the economic factors that influence 
countries’ cooperation on pollution agreements and resource agreements. Specifically, we 
estimate a probit model to examine the likelihood of two countries having an agreement. 
We estimate an ordinary least square model and two linear dynamic panel data models to 
examine the number of agreements two countries have. We run probit and OLS models 
for each year from 1980 to 2000 by using cross-sectional data. To explore the dynamic 
nature of the data, we employ the dynamic panel data models from 1960 to 2005.  
The econometric framework used in the first method is the binary choice model. 
In equation (1),  denotes a latent variable which is the utility countries gain from a 
multilateral environmental agreement (either pollution related or resource related).  On 
the right hand side,  represents a vector of explanatory variables which were introduced 
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in the previous section and  a vector of parameters. The error term  is assumed to be 
independent of  and to have a standard normal distribution.  
.  (1) 
Since countries’ utility gains from an MEA cannot be observed, we introduce an indicator 
variable, MEA, which is equal to one if two countries are both parties to an MEA. We 
expect countries to form an MEA if the utility they gain from the agreement is positive 
and not to enter without benefits. We therefore define  if  and zero 
otherwise. We then estimate the following binary choice model, 
  (2) 
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
The econometric framework used in the second method is the linear regression 
model as shown in equation (3). The dependent variable  measures the number of 
pollution related agreements or resource related agreements that both countries have 
ratified in a certain year, while the independent variables are the same as those in 
equation (1)  
.  (3) 
 We estimate the above specifications year by year from 1980 to 2000 allowing us 
to examine the stability of the determinants over time. However, it is possible that 
countries’ joint membership to environmental agreements may also affect their economic 
performances such as GDP and bilateral trade flows. Rose and Spiegel (2009) argue 
countries’ joint MEA participation promotes their cross-holdings of assets. On the other 
hand, Besedes et al. (2016) and Besedes and Wang (2016) show that countries’ joint 
MEA membership has a small negative effect on their bilateral trade flows. To deal with 
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the possible reverse causality issue, we use the 1970 data on GDPs, trade agreement, and 
trade flows.  
To further explore the dynamic structure of our data, we employ several dynamic 
panel data models. In a certain year, the number of agreements two countries have may 
influence their environmental cooperation in subsequent years. In other words, the history 
of countries’ cooperation on environmental issues may play a role in their current 
cooperation. To examine this possibility, we include the lagged dependent variables in 
the following model,  
  (4) 
in which  measures the environmental agreements two countries have in previous 
year and  captures the unobserved country-pair level effect.  
We can eliminate  by employing first-difference or fixed-effect estimations. 
However, there is still correlation between the differenced lagged dependent variable and 
the disturbance term. One way to solve the problem is to use moment conditions in which 
lags of the dependent variable and first differences of the independent variables are 
instruments for the first-differenced equation (Arellano and Bond, 1991). A potential 
weakness of the Arellano–Bond estimator is that lagged levels are often rather poor 
instruments for first differenced variables, especially when the variables are close to a 
random walk. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) include moment 
conditions in which lagged differences are instruments for the level equation as well as 
the moment conditions used in Arellano–Bond estimation. Both of these two methods 
assume that there is no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. We will present one-
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step GMM estimator and two-step GMM estimator by using Arellano–Bond method as 
well as Arellano and Bover/Blundell and Bond method.   
We separately examine the MEAs with a small number of signatories and those 
with a large number of signatories. Specifically, for pollution agreements, we focus on 
MEAs with less than 36 signatories (sample median) and those with more than 63 
signatories (3rd quartile), while for resource agreements, we examine MEAs with less 
than 10 signatories (sample median) and those with more than 28 signatories (3rd 
quartile). This approach is motivated by a hypothesis that environmental agreements 
(pollution and resource related) with a small number of signatories are more likely to be 
initiated in order to deal with common pool resource issues. These agreements are more 
likely to have binding commitments and are more likely to be affected by economic 
determinants. Large agreements, especially those including almost all the countries in the 
world, may be agreements only expressing an intent to deal with an issue and may not 
have binding commitments for its members. Economic factors may not have any effects 
on such agreements.   
 Multilateral environmental agreement data come from Ronald Mitchell’s 
International Environmental Agreement Database Project (2016). Basic information on 
multilateral environmental agreements includes subject or topic of the agreement, its 
beginning date, and membership. Treaties are categorized into eight subjects: energy, 
freshwater resources, habitat, nature, oceans, weapons and environment, pollution, and 
species. In addition, agreements dealing with pollution are further divided into four 
categories: pollution related to air, land, ocean, and waste. Agreements dealing with 
species are also divided into four categories: agriculture, birds, fish, and mammals. 
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Member countries and the date when those members ratified the agreement are identified 
in the database. 
3.4 Results 
We first present results for pollution agreements and then for resource agreements. In 
each category, we begin by comparing the results using MEAs with fewer than the 
median number of signatories and MEAs with greater than the 3rd quartile number of 
signatories respectively for the year 2000. This gives us a general idea about how 
economic factors affect countries’ cooperation on various agreements in a given year. We 
then estimate our specifications annually from 1980 to 2000 and plot the coefficients of 
each explanatory variable over time to examine how the effect of each factor changes 
over time. As mentioned before, we use 1970 data on GDPs, trade flows, and trade 
agreement variable to account for potential endogeneity issues. We then present the 
results of quantile regressions for the year 2000.  After that, we show the dynamic panel 
data estimates by using data from 1960 to 2005. At last, we show the evidence of 
spillover effects which indicate that countries’ cooperation on one type of agreements 
may influence their cooperation on other types. 
Previewing our results, economic size, distance, and economic integration 
variables can successfully explain countries’ cooperation on both pollution related 
agreements and resource related agreements. These effects are most robust for the 
agreements with a small number of signatories. 
3.4.1 Economic Determinants of Pollution Related Agreements 
Table 3.1 presents the probit and OLS results using pollution MEAs with less 
than 36 (the median) signatories for the year 2000. Panel 1 (the first four columns) shows 
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the marginal effects for the likelihood of two countries having a pollution agreement. The 
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if two countries have an MEA in 2000 and 
zero otherwise.  
 We exclude GDPs and trade related variables and focus mainly on geographic 
variables in column one. We include GDP variables in column 2 and then include trade 
agreement and trade values in column 3 and 4 respectively. For column one, distance has 
a negative effect indicating that closer countries are more likely to have a pollution 
related agreement. As we argued before, closer countries may have more economic 
interactions with each other and they may also share similar cultural backgrounds which 
may facilitate their cooperation. In addition, the pollution agreements with a small 
number of countries may mainly deal with regional environmental issues which only 
those close countries are interested in. Similarly, the same region dummy also has a 
positive and significant effect. The length of border has a positive but insignificant effect. 
Common official language has a negative effect which means that countries with the 
same official language are less likely to have a pollution agreement. Most countries 
where English is the official language are former British Colonies. These countries are 
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Table 3.1 Results for pollution agreements with fewer than the sample median number of signatories 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 























SUM OF GDP 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0121*** 0.0638*** 0.0580*** 0.0326*** 0.241*** 0.303*** 
(0.000692) (0.000696) (0.000729) (0.00395) (0.00367) (0.00280) (0.0171) (0.0165) 
DIFFERENCE IN GDP 0.000949 0.000911 0.000827 -0.0147*** -0.0195*** -0.0199*** -0.00797 -0.00336 
(0.000999) (0.00101) (0.000996) (0.00324) (0.00351) (0.00350) (0.0259) (0.0243) 
SUM OF IMPORTS 0.000873*** 0.0119*** 0.0320*** 0.0293*** 
(0.000154) (0.00119) (0.00390) (0.00335) 
DISTANCE -0.0479*** -0.0283*** -0.0282*** -0.0252*** -0.241*** -0.201*** -0.173*** -0.142*** -0.532*** -0.628*** 
(0.00387) (0.00312) (0.00314) (0.00308) (0.0228) (0.0203) (0.0193) (0.0185) (0.0672) (0.0678) 
BORDER LENGTH 0.00206 -0.00208 -0.00216* -0.00163 0.0252 0.00795 -0.00637 -0.00260 -0.0711*** -0.0743*** 
(0.00202) (0.00129) (0.00130) (0.00129) (0.0245) (0.0235) (0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0227) (0.0272) 
COMMON LANGUAGE -0.0315*** 0.00280 0.00238 0.000708 -0.188*** -0.0925*** -0.138*** -0.163*** -0.381*** -0.159 
(0.00674) (0.00468) (0.00478) (0.00471) (0.0222) (0.0185) (0.0213) (0.0223) (0.114) (0.115) 
SAME REGION 0.0260*** 0.0381*** 0.0377*** 0.0372*** 0.366*** 0.465*** 0.446*** 0.447*** 1.708*** 1.534*** 
(0.00737) (0.00580) (0.00577) (0.00570) (0.0443) (0.0462) (0.0443) (0.0433) (0.126) (0.130) 
NEIGHBOR REGION 0.00823 0.00276 0.00303 0.00588 -0.106*** -0.117*** -0.0743*** -0.0504* 0.653*** 0.466*** 
(0.00746) (0.00557) (0.00562) (0.00555) (0.0308) (0.0301) (0.0288) (0.0285) (0.145) (0.144) 
TRADE AGREEMENT 0.00502 -0.000831 0.697*** 0.612*** 0.294*** 0.316** 
(0.00598) (0.00589) (0.120) (0.117) (0.111) (0.129) 
Observations 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 






often located in less developed regions such as Africa and Asia where resource 
exploitation instead of pollution may be the major international environmental issue. As 
we will show later, countries with common official language are indeed more likely to 
have a resource related agreement.  
For column two, the sum of logged GDPs has a positive effect which indicates 
that economically large countries are more likely to have a pollution agreement. If we 
increase the product of two countries’ real GDPs by 10%, the probability of them having 
an environmental agreement increases by about 0.14%. The difference of logged GDPs 
has a positive but insignificant effect. Similar to column one, distance has a negative and 
significant effect, and the same region dummy has a significantly positive effect. The 
effect of common language becomes positive but insignificant.  
We add the trade agreement dummy in column three and it has a positive but 
insignificant effect. The trade agreement variable includes various types of agreements 
including one-way preferential trade agreement, two-way preferential trade agreement, 
free trade agreement, and deeper trade agreements such as customs union. The effect we 
obtain may reflect an aggregate effect of various types of agreements. GDPs, distance, 
and the same region dummy have similar effect as those in column two. In column four, 
we add bilateral trade flow variable which has a significantly positive but relatively small 
effect. It indicates that countries with more bilateral trade are more likely to have a 
pollution agreement.  
Panel 2 (the last six columns of Table 1) examines the number of pollution 
agreements two countries have. Columns 5 to 8 have the similar patterns with those in 
Panel 1. The last two columns show the results using Poisson and Negative Binomial 
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regressions due to the count nature of the dependent variable. As mentioned above, 
results in this panel explore the intensity of countries’ environmental coordination. The 
results are very consistent across various specifications. Economically larger countries 
and countries with similar size have more pollution agreements. Closer countries and 
those within the same region have more agreements. Countries with a trade agreement 
and those with larger trade flows tend to have more pollution agreements.  
In column 5, distance has a significantly negative effect indicating that closer 
countries tend to have more pollution agreements. Countries within the same 
geographical region also tend to have more agreements. Countries with common 
language and located in neighboring regions have fewer agreements. In column 6, the 
sum of logged GDPs has a significantly positive effect, while the difference of logged 
GDPs has a significantly negative effect. This implies that economically larger countries 
and countries with similar economic sizes tend to have more pollution agreements. The 
trade agreement variable has a significantly positive effect on the number of agreements 
two countries have in column 7. In addition, countries with more bilateral trade flows 
have more pollution agreements as shown in column 8 which is the baseline result. In 
columns 9 and 10, we estimate Poisson and negative binomial regressions. As we can 
see, most variables in these two columns have similar effects with those in the baseline 








Table 3.2 Results for pollution agreements with greater than the 3rd quartile number of signatories 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
























SUM OF GDP 
 
0.00927*** 0.00895*** 0.00117 
 
0.439*** 0.425*** 0.196*** 0.0352*** 0.0322*** 
  
(0.000933) (0.000944) (0.00108) 
 
(0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0154) (0.00264) (0.00261) 
DIFFERENCE IN GDP 
 
0.00741*** 0.00709*** 0.00625*** 
 
0.108*** 0.0959*** 0.0926*** 0.0166*** 0.0233*** 
  
(0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00154) 
 
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0210) (0.00343) (0.00344) 
SUM OF IMPORTS 
   
0.00467*** 
   
0.108*** 0.0149*** 0.0155*** 
    
(0.000343) 
   
(0.00401) (0.000583) (0.000597) 
DISTANCE -0.0305*** -0.0235*** -0.0219*** -0.0118** -0.543*** -0.269*** -0.199*** 0.0814 0.00787 0.000941 
 
(0.00651) (0.00626) (0.00628) (0.00601) (0.0789) (0.0746) (0.0736) (0.0718) (0.0119) (0.0128) 
BORDER LENGTH 0.00445 0.00194 0.000957 0.00134 0.0806 -0.0343 -0.0700* -0.0359 -0.00395 -0.00323 
 
(0.00421) (0.00414) (0.00418) (0.00406) (0.0500) (0.0429) (0.0412) (0.0400) (0.00590) (0.00629) 
COMMON LANGUAGE -0.0255*** -0.0131* -0.0152* -0.0238*** -0.619*** -0.00420 -0.117 -0.347*** -0.0569*** -0.0588*** 
 
(0.00768) (0.00774) (0.00782) (0.00741) (0.104) (0.100) (0.101) (0.0972) (0.0171) (0.0180) 
SAME REGION -0.0371*** -0.0127 -0.0129 -0.00854 -0.779*** 0.0720 0.0246 0.0294 -0.0156 -0.0551** 
 
(0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.161) (0.153) (0.151) (0.143) (0.0255) (0.0274) 
NEIGHBOR REGION 0.0365*** 0.0383*** 0.0402*** 0.0432*** 0.944*** 0.947*** 1.054*** 1.270*** 0.194*** 0.191*** 
 





1.737*** 0.974*** 0.125*** 0.142*** 
   
(0.0234) (0.0236) 
  
(0.236) (0.226) (0.0279) (0.0307) 
Observations 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 
R-squared 
   
0.025 0.142 0.148 0.210 
  
ln(\lnalpha) 
        
-1.437*** 
                    (0.0344) 
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In Table 3.2, we present the results using pollution MEAs with more than 63 
(3rd quartile) signatories. Some large agreements in this category, such as United Nations 
Framework Convention On Climate Change, may bias our results because they tend to be 
symbolic and have no binding commitments for the signatory countries. As a result, 
economic factors may not play a role here. The column 4 of Table 3.2 has the baseline 
result of the likelihood of having an agreement. The sum of logged GDPs has a positive 
but insignificant effect. The difference of logged GDPs has a significantly positive effect 
indicating that the larger the difference of two countries’ economic sizes the more likely 
they will have a large pollution agreement. The same region dummy has a negative and 
insignificant effect. These three variables have insignificant or unexpected signs which 
confirm our previous prediction. Similar with the results by using small agreements, 
bilateral trade flows have a positive effect, and distance has a negative effect. The column 
8 presents the results of the number of pollution agreements. Since the OLS estimation 
examines the relative numbers of agreements, the problems caused by those super large 
agreements are somehow relieved. As we can see, except for difference of logged GDP 
and distance, other explanatory variables have expected effects. 
In this section, we estimate our specifications year by year from 1980 to 2000. We 
plot the marginal effects of each explanatory variable for probit model and OLS estimates 
for least square model. First, we present the results for agreements with fewer than 36 
signatories in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. We present the results for those with more than 63 
signatories in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. In Figure 3.2, we plot the marginal effect of probit 
and a 95% confidence interval of each explanatory variable year by year from 1980 to 
2000. The sum of logged GDPs has a significantly positive and increasing effect over 
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time which is consistent with what we have shown in Table 1. The difference in GDPs 
has a positive effect over time but the effect is insignificant in most of years. The bilateral 
trade flow variable has a positive and increasing effect over time. Distance has a negative 
effect and as time goes by the effect becomes larger. Border length and common 
language variables barely have significant effects over time. The same region variable 
has a significantly positive effect over time, while the effect of neighbor region is 
positive but insignificant in most of the years. The trade agreement variable has a positive 
effect in most of the years but this effect is not significant especially in most recent years. 
In Figure 3.3, we plot similar graph for economic factors determining the number 
of small pollution agreements two countries have. The sum of GDPs has a positive and 
increasing effect over time, and the difference in GDPs has a negative effect over time. 
Both effects are statistically significant. Bilateral trade flows have a significantly positive 
effect over time. Distance and common language have negative effects, while same 
region has a positive effect over time. Trade agreement has a positive effect over time 
and the effect is significant in all years. All the important economic factors, economic 
size, distance, trade flows and trade agreement, have expected signs. 
Figure 3.4 and 3.5 show the results for pollution agreements with more than 63 
signatories. In Figure 3.4, several factors have mixed effects over time. For example, the 
difference in GDPs has a significant negative effect in early years but the effect becomes 
positive after mid-1990s. Also, distance has a negative effect before 1997 and a positive 
one from 1997 to 2000. As we argued above, the existence of some large agreements that 
include almost every country in the world may bias our results. OLS results shown in 
Figure 3.5 are similar with those have in Figure 3.3. The reason may be that OLS 
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estimation compares the number of agreements and countries with more economic 
interactions tend to have more agreements which may not be affected by large 
agreements. 
OLS results show the effects of explanatory variables on the conditional mean of 
the dependent variable. However, it is interesting to examine the effects on various 
quantiles of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, especially is the 
dependent variable has a skewed distribution. We examine how economic factors may 
affect the number of agreements two countries have at different quantiles (0.25, 0.5, and 
0.75). Table 3.3 shows the results of quantile regressions by using all pollution 
agreements for the year 2000. We show the baseline OLS results in the first column, 
which is followed by the results at 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 quantiles in columns 2 to 4 
respectively. Most of the independent variables in the last three columns have similar 
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Table 3.3 Results of quantile regressions for pollution agreements in 2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES baseline OLS 25th 50th 75th 
          
SUM OF GDP 0.304*** 0.185*** 0.211*** 0.398*** 
 
(0.0180) (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0316) 
DIFF IN GDP 0.0493** -0.0406* 0.0257 0.326*** 
 
(0.0238) (0.0243) (0.0249) (0.0415) 
SUM OF IMPORT 0.142*** 0.0886*** 0.173*** 0.158*** 
 
(0.00478) (0.00418) (0.00700) (0.00791) 
DISTANCE -0.629*** -0.0115 -0.155* -0.879*** 
 
(0.0887) (0.0858) (0.0810) (0.159) 
BORDER LENGTH -0.125** 0.0642 -0.0219 -0.190** 
 
(0.0523) (0.0404) (0.0752) (0.0817) 
LANGUAGE -0.815*** -0.562*** -0.351*** -0.659*** 
 
(0.117) (0.147) (0.0898) (0.171) 
SAME REGION 0.859*** 0.0789 -0.0516 0.399 
 
(0.181) (0.185) (0.135) (0.424) 
NEIGHBOR REGION 1.620*** 1.198*** 1.819*** 2.186*** 
 
(0.172) (0.166) (0.267) (0.261) 
TRADE AGREEMENT 2.033*** 0.973*** 1.257*** 2.127*** 
 
(0.252) (0.260) (0.384) (0.722) 
Constant 5.058*** -0.134 1.853** 7.160*** 
 
(0.867) (0.843) (0.802) (1.547) 
     
Observations 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 











Table 3.4 shows the results of dynamic panel data analysis of pollution 
agreements with a small number of signatories. The first panel in Table 3.4 shows the 
results of Arellano–Bond estimation, while the second panel shows the results of 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation. We implement both one-step GMM and two-
step GMM in each method. In each specification, we use one lag of GDP variables and 
trade agreement variable. 
Beginning with the Arellano–Bond estimators, we estimate one-step GMM with 
one lag of the number of agreements in column one. As expected, the lagged dependent 
variable has a positive effect indicating that the number of pollution agreements two 
countries have in the previous year has a positive effect on the number in the current 
year. For other explanatory variables, economically larger countries, countries with 
similar economic size, and those with trade agreements tend to have more pollution 
agreements. These results are consistent with those in the OLS and quantile regressions. 
In column two, we include two lags of the dependent variable. The twice lagged variable 
also has a positive effect although the magnitude is smaller than the once lagged variable. 
Other economic factors have similar effects with those in column one. The third and 
fourth columns show two-step GMM coefficients with one lag and two lags of the 
dependent variable respectively. As we can see, two-step GMM estimates are very 
similar in both signs and magnitudes with the one-step estimates. The last four columns 
show the results of Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation. They are similar to those 
in the first four columns. The lags of dependent variable have positive effects. The sum 





Table 3.4 Results of dynamic panel data analysis for pollution agreements 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Arellano–Bond estimation Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation 
VARIABLES one_step one_step two_step two_step one_step one_step two_step two_step 
L.MEA 0.968*** 0.764*** 0.968*** 0.764*** 0.960*** 0.760*** 0.960*** 0.760*** 
 


















L.SUM_GDP 0.0405*** 0.0368*** 0.0405*** 0.0368*** 0.0600*** 0.0630*** 0.0598 0.0629* 
 
(0.00285) (0.00251) (0.00285) (0.00251) (0.00495) (0.00501) (0.0684) (0.0380) 
L.GDP_SIM 0.0230*** 0.0196*** 0.0230*** 0.0196*** 0.0250*** 0.0243*** 0.0252 0.0248 
 
(0.00168) (0.00144) (0.00169) (0.00144) (0.00258) (0.00267) (0.0595) (0.0317) 
L.TRADE AGREEMENT 0.00628*** 0.00623*** 0.00621*** 0.00624*** 0.00823*** 0.00982*** 0.00839 0.0101 
 
(0.00240) (0.00211) (0.00237) (0.00211) (0.00302) (0.00279) (0.0131) (0.0368) 
DISTANCE 
    
-0.294* -0.0643 -0.297 -0.0709 
     
(0.169) (0.175) (0.181) (0.185) 
BORDER LENGTH 
    
-0.0361 -0.0697 -0.0382 -0.0692 
     
(0.0594) (0.0653) (0.0938) (0.0566) 
COMMON LANGUAGE 
    
-1.119*** -0.813*** -1.115*** -0.807*** 
     
(0.213) (0.159) (0.297) (0.176) 
SAME REGION 
    
-0.724** 0.255 -0.721* 0.247 
     
(0.347) (0.363) (0.410) (0.351) 
NEIGHBOR REGION 
    
-0.223 1.399*** -0.207 1.411*** 
     
(0.374) (0.335) (0.508) (0.387) 
Constant 
    
2.320 -0.0811 2.348 -0.0274 
     
(1.575) (1.606) (1.910) (1.704) 
Observations 542,039 536,208 542,039 536,208 543,410 537,687 543,410 537,687 
Number of country pairs 18,100 18,100 18,100 18,100 17,898 17,898 17,898 17,898 
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3.4.2 Economic Determinants of Resource Related Agreements 
We next investigate the economic factors that contribute to countries’ cooperation 
on resource agreements. Table 3.5 shows the results using resource agreements with less 
than 10 (the median) signatories for year 2000. As before, panel 1 examines the 
likelihood of having an agreement, while panel 2 examines the number of agreements 
two countries have. Since most economic factors have consistent effects across various 
specifications, we mainly focus on column 4 which is the baseline result for probit model 
and column 5, the baseline result for OLS model. In column 4, for gravity variables, the 
sum of logged GDPs has a positive effect and the difference of logged GDPs has a 
negative effect which implies that economically larger countries and countries with 
similar economic sizes are more likely to have resource agreement with a relatively small 
number of signatories. The distance has a negative effect. Common language has a 
positive effect. As we argued before, many countries with the same official language are 
located in Africa or Asia which tend to rely more heavily on resource exploitation. For 
common resource variables, both border length and same region have significantly 
positive effects. For economic integration variables, both trade agreement and trade flows 
have positive effects. In column 5, these variables that influence the likelihood of having 
a resource agreement have similar effects on the number of agreements two countries 
have.  
Table 3.6 presents the results using resource agreements with more than 28 (3rd 
quartile) signatories. Trade agreement, trade flow, and distance have expected effects. 
Other factors like difference in GDPs and same region have contradicting effects. For 
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example, countries within the same region are less likely to have an agreement but they 
tend to have more agreements. 
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Table 3.5 Results for resource agreements with fewer than the sample median number of signatories 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 























SUM OF GDP 0.00777*** 0.00767*** 0.00639*** 0.0488*** 0.0428*** 0.0320*** 0.261*** 0.348*** 
(0.000540) (0.000532) (0.000523) (0.00419) (0.00392) (0.00385) (0.0223) (0.0216) 
DIFFERENCE IN GDP -0.00250*** -0.00272*** -0.00267*** -0.0197*** -0.0246*** -0.0248*** -0.113*** -0.151*** 
(0.000627) (0.000640) (0.000626) (0.00309) (0.00340) (0.00341) (0.0312) (0.0301) 
SUM OF IMPORTS 0.000460*** 0.00505*** 0.00975** 0.0148*** 
(9.59e-05) (0.00109) (0.00397) (0.00426) 
DISTANCE -0.0263*** -0.0108*** -0.0104*** -0.00890*** -0.186*** -0.155*** -0.126*** -0.113*** -0.522*** -0.569*** 
(0.00300) (0.00193) (0.00194) (0.00191) (0.0274) (0.0258) (0.0241) (0.0233) (0.0902) (0.0820) 
BORDER LENGTH 0.0136*** 0.00591*** 0.00594*** 0.00603*** 0.256*** 0.243*** 0.228*** 0.230*** 0.0662*** 0.137*** 
(0.00153) (0.000896) (0.000904) (0.000895) (0.0340) (0.0330) (0.0320) (0.0319) (0.0233) (0.0236) 
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.0218*** 0.0266*** 0.0256*** 0.0242*** 0.0611*** 0.136*** 0.0893*** 0.0785*** 0.874*** 1.260*** 
(0.00422) (0.00270) (0.00269) (0.00259) (0.0230) (0.0228) (0.0242) (0.0246) (0.124) (0.121) 
SAME REGION 0.0486*** 0.0410*** 0.0407*** 0.0399*** 0.200*** 0.269*** 0.250*** 0.250*** 1.481*** 1.673*** 
(0.00556) (0.00453) (0.00454) (0.00445) (0.0318) (0.0328) (0.0311) (0.0310) (0.171) (0.158) 
NEIGHBOR REGION -0.00161 -0.000562 0.000353 0.00207 -0.191*** -0.203*** -0.158*** -0.148*** 0.0323 -0.0545 
(0.00634) (0.00386) (0.00393) (0.00387) (0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0306) (0.0299) (0.199) (0.182) 
TRADE AGREEMENT 0.0138*** 0.0106*** 0.719*** 0.683*** 0.518*** 0.589*** 
(0.00396) (0.00386) (0.130) (0.129) (0.136) (0.165) 
Observations 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 




Table 3.6 Results for resource agreements with greater than the 3rd quartile number of signatories 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Panel 1 The likelihood of having an MEA Panel 2 The number of MEAs two countries have 
VARIABLES 
No GDPs, PTAs, 
or trade flows 






No GDPs, PTAs, 
or trade flows 









SUM OF GDP 0.00657*** 0.00611*** 0.000385 1.191*** 1.149*** 0.784*** 0.0798*** 0.0718*** 
(0.000734) (0.000732) (0.000730) (0.0285) (0.0274) (0.0256) (0.00210) (0.00205) 
DIFFERENCE IN GDP 0.00221* 0.00189 0.00122 -0.347*** -0.382*** -0.387*** -0.0335*** -0.0267*** 
(0.00126) (0.00123) (0.00101) (0.0291) (0.0296) (0.0286) (0.00263) (0.00255) 
SUM OF IMPORTS 0.00370*** 0.171*** 0.0118*** 0.0122*** 
(0.000262) (0.00803) (0.000533) (0.000521) 
DISTANCE -0.0330*** -0.0273*** -0.0248*** -0.0141*** -2.514*** -1.765*** -1.560*** -1.115*** -0.103*** -0.0856*** 
(0.00532) (0.00511) (0.00506) (0.00426) (0.166) (0.131) (0.129) (0.125) (0.00983) (0.00967) 
BORDER LENGTH 0.0168*** 0.0137** 0.0125** 0.0119** 0.170 -0.153 -0.257** -0.203* -0.0212*** -0.0168*** 
(0.00589) (0.00581) (0.00592) (0.00494) (0.147) (0.119) (0.116) (0.112) (0.00570) (0.00538) 
COMMON LANGUAGE -0.00446 0.00484 0.00214 -0.00512 -2.187*** -0.383** -0.714*** -1.080*** -0.0858*** -0.0636*** 
(0.00621) (0.00617) (0.00607) (0.00508) (0.187) (0.154) (0.160) (0.158) (0.0140) (0.0137) 
SAME REGION -0.0408*** -0.0251*** -0.0244*** -0.0161** 1.077*** 2.880*** 2.741*** 2.749*** 0.218*** 0.176*** 
(0.00919) (0.00902) (0.00885) (0.00729) (0.338) (0.310) (0.300) (0.283) (0.0217) (0.0205) 
NEIGHBOR REGION 0.00917 0.0106 0.0125 0.0147 1.152*** 0.924*** 1.236*** 1.580*** 0.142*** 0.157*** 
(0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.00908) (0.278) (0.236) (0.234) (0.228) (0.0181) (0.0178) 
TRADE AGREEMENT 0.0946*** 0.0581* 5.076*** 3.863*** 0.198*** 0.187*** 
(0.0345) (0.0315) (0.617) (0.594) (0.0265) (0.0257) 
Observations 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 




We present the probit and OLS results for the resource agreements with less than 
10 signatories in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. In Figure 3.6, gravity variables, the sum 
of logged GDPs has positive effects and the difference in logged GDPs has negative 
effects over time. Distance has a negative effect and common language has a negative 
effect over time. For economic integration variables, both bilateral trade flows and trade 
agreement have positive effects over time. For common resource variables, both border 
length and same region variables have positive effects over time. In Figure 7, our factors 
of most interest have similar effects across years.  
In Figures 3.8 and 3.9, we present the probit and OLS results for resource agreements 
with more than 28 signatories. Several important economic factors, such as the sum of 
GDPs and same region dummy, do not have a consistent effect over time in Figure 3.8. 
However, the OLS results in Figure 3.9 are much better. Most economic factors have the 
expected signs. 
Table 3.7 shows the quantile regression results of all resource agreements for the 
year 2000. Column one shows the baseline OLS results and columns 2 to 4 show the 
0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 quantile regression results. Similar with the results by using pollution 
agreements, economic factors have consistent effects across OLS and various quantile 
regressions. Specifically, economic size, trade agreement, and bilateral trade flows have 
positive effects while distance has a negative effect on various quantiles of conditional 
distribution of dependent variable.  
In Table 3.8, we show the results by using dynamic panel data analysis of 
resource agreements. Here we only focus on the resource agreements with less than 10 
signatories (median). The dependent variable is the number of resource agreements two 
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countries have in a year. Similar with the Table 3.4, the first panel in Table 3.8 shows the 
Arellano–Bond estimates while the second panel shows the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-
Bond estimates. In each panel, we present one-step GMM estimate and two-step GMM 
estimates respectively. As we can see, explanatory variables of greatest interest show 
consistent effects across various estimation methods. Specifically, once lagged dependent 
variable has a significantly positive effect but twice lagged variable has insignificant 
effect. Economically larger countries and countries with similar economic sizes tend to 
have more resource agreements. One thing worth mentioning is that the effects of 
economic size variables are much smaller than those in Table 3.4. The trade agreement 
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Figure 3.9 OLS results using resource agreements with more than 3rd quartile number of signatories
71
72 
Table 3.7 Results of quantile regressions for resource agreements in 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES baseline OLS 25th 50th 75th 
SUM OF GDP 0.890*** 0.538*** 0.608*** 0.746*** 
(0.0259) (0.0232) (0.0196) (0.0207) 
DIFF IN GDP -0.458*** -0.305*** -0.237*** -0.289*** 
(0.0343) (0.0306) (0.0244) (0.0240) 
SUM OF IMPORT 0.190*** 0.123*** 0.134*** 0.170*** 
(0.00688) (0.00612) (0.00634) (0.00930) 
DISTANCE -1.425*** -0.391*** -0.638*** -0.773*** 
(0.128) (0.120) (0.106) (0.113) 
BORDER LENGTH 0.0813 0.231*** 0.126* 0.175 
(0.0753) (0.0742) (0.0743) (0.178) 
LANGUAGE -0.888*** -0.540*** -0.0247 0.204 
(0.168) (0.171) (0.127) (0.142) 
SAME REGION 3.849*** 1.303*** 1.779*** 3.056*** 
(0.261) (0.236) (0.260) (0.262) 
NEIGHBOR REGION 1.646*** 1.573*** 1.770*** 2.256*** 
(0.247) (0.255) (0.219) (0.237) 
TRADE AGREEMENT 5.307*** 2.861*** 1.841*** 2.642 
(0.363) (0.336) (0.285) (1.835) 
Constant 5.709*** 0.660 3.753*** 4.682*** 
(1.249) (1.176) (1.023) (1.084) 
Observations 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 
R-squared 0.449 
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Table 3.8 Results of dynamic panel data analysis for resource agreements 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Arellano–Bond estimation Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation 
VARIABLES one_step one_step two_step two_step one_step one_step two_step two_step 
L.MEA 0.965*** 0.972*** 0.965*** 0.972*** 0.976*** 0.986*** 0.976*** 0.986*** 
(0.00653) (0.00882) (0.00653) (0.00882) (0.00516) (0.00766) (0.151) (0.184) 
L2.MEA -0.00167 -0.00167 -0.00622 -0.00621 
(0.00662) (0.00663) (0.00678) (0.0521) 
L.SUM_GDP 0.00387*** 0.00486*** 0.00377*** 0.00485*** 0.00317* 0.00384** 0.00300 0.00381 
(0.00117) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00187) (0.00178) (0.0509) (0.0787) 
L.GDP_SIM 0.00131* 0.00178** 0.00130* 0.00184** 0.000389 0.000621 0.000464 0.000781 
(0.000755) (0.000749) (0.000745) (0.000743) (0.00110) (0.00107) (0.0372) (0.0809) 
L.TRADE AGREEMENT -0.000774 -0.000648 -0.000724 -0.000613 -0.00290 -0.00218 -0.00271 -0.00220 
(0.00169) (0.00169) (0.00160) (0.00170) (0.00183) (0.00184) (0.0600) (0.122) 
DISTANCE -0.0675 -0.0594 -0.0649 -0.0583 
(0.0437) (0.0432) (0.248) (0.258) 
BORDER LENGTH 0.0184 0.0160 0.0188 0.0165 
(0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0436) (0.144) 
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.0881 0.0945* 0.0806 0.0921 
(0.0570) (0.0557) (0.145) (0.259) 
SAME REGION -0.0264 -0.0334 -0.0235 -0.0334 
(0.126) (0.128) (0.154) (0.404) 
NEIGHBOR REGION 0.494*** 0.477*** 0.475 0.475 
(0.181) (0.179) (0.765) (0.917) 
Constant 0.494 0.417 0.478 0.410 
(0.404) (0.400) (1.822) (2.041) 
Observations 542,039 536,208 542,039 536,208 543,410 537,687 543,410 537,687 
Number of tt 18,100 18,100 18,100 18,100 17,898 17,898 17,898 17,898 
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3.4.3 The Spillover effects between different types of agreements 
In the last section, we examine whether countries’ cooperation on pollution 
agreements may contribute to their cooperation on resource agreements or vice versus. 
The results are presented in Table 3.9. The first two columns show the result of the probit 
model, while the last two columns show the results of the OLS model. In column one, the 
dependent variable measures whether two countries have a pollution agreement in 2000. 
The variable, MEA_RESOURCE_DUMMY_1970, measures whether two countries have 
a resource agreement in 1970. If this variable has a positive effect, it would indicate that 
countries’ cooperation on resource agreements may increase their likelihood to cooperate 
on pollution agreements. As we can see, it has a positive but insignificant effect. Other 
explanatory variables in column one have similar effects with what we have before. In 
column two, MEA_POLLUTION_DUMMY_1970 has a positive and significant (at 
10%) effect indicating that countries’ cooperation on pollution agreements may promote 
their cooperation on resource ones. In column three, MEA_RESOURCE_1970 measures 
the number of resource agreements two countries have in 1970 and it has a significantly 
positive effect. Similarly, in the last column, MEA_POLLUTION_1970 which measures 
the number of pollution agreements two countries have in 1970 also has a significantly 
positive effect. In addition, the spillover effect in column four is much larger than that in 
column three.  This indicates that the effect of pollution agreements on resource 
agreements is much larger than the effect vice versus. 
75 
Table 3.9 Results of spillover effects among pollution and resource agreements 
1 2 3 4 
Probit  OLS 









SUM_GDP_1970 0.0285*** 0.0154*** 0.0838*** 0.0684*** 
(0.00140) (0.00106) (0.00470) (0.00414) 
GDP_SIM_1970 0.0125*** 0.0112*** 0.0546*** 0.0569*** 
(0.00140) (0.00108) (0.00525) (0.00466) 
DISTANCE -0.0283*** -0.0102*** -0.147*** -0.0851*** 
(0.00314) (0.00196) (0.0136) (0.0122) 
BORDER LENGTH -0.00235* 0.00613*** -0.0579*** 0.220*** 
(0.00135) (0.000923) (0.00824) (0.00726) 
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.00195 0.0263*** -0.167*** 0.122*** 
(0.00480) (0.00273) (0.0180) (0.0161) 
SAME REGION 0.0373*** 0.0408*** 0.385*** 0.195*** 
(0.00581) (0.00455) (0.0282) (0.0252) 
NEIGHBOR REGION 0.00342 0.000664 -0.0211 -0.107*** 
(0.00563) (0.00399) (0.0266) (0.0238) 
TRADE AGREEMENT_1970 0.00433 0.0140*** 0.540*** 0.541*** 
(0.00600) (0.00405) (0.0390) (0.0348) 
Constant 0.640*** 0.216* 
(0.135) (0.120) 
Observations 9,216 9,216 9,216 9,216 
R-squared 0.303 0.438 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we separately examine the economic determinants of pollution related 
agreements and resource related agreements. Pollution agreements mainly deal with 
pollution affecting air, land, oceans, or freshwater system. Resource related agreements 
include those dealing with natural resource, habitat, freshwater resource, ocean, and 
species. The former category addresses various forms of pollution, while the latter one 
mainly focuses on the conservation of natural resources. Using Ronald Mitchell’s 
International Environmental Agreement database (2002-2016), we find that economic 
size, distance, trade agreements, and bilateral trade flows have statistically significant 
effects on countries’ coordination on both pollution related agreements and resource 
related agreements. These results are most robust for the MEAs between a small numbers 
of countries. In addition, we find the evidence that countries’ cooperation on pollution 
agreements may contribute to their cooperation on resource agreements and vice versus. 
77 
CHAPTER 4 
ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF TIMING OF MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent years, news related to international pollution such as global warming, acid rains, 
oil spills, and the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is always able to attract 
public attention. Many of these problems are rather urgent and require countries’ 
immediate action to protect the environment before it is too late. Since no country can 
solve this kind of environmental issue alone, countries need to coordinate with each other 
through international environmental agreements. We observe that some countries 
cooperate on environmental agreements early, while others cooperate late. In this paper, 
we examine the economic determinants of the timing of countries’ cooperation on 
international pollution agreements. 
We examine the most comprehensive list of pollution agreements by using 
Ronald Mitchell’s International Environmental Agreement Database Project (2002-2016). 
The first pollution agreement in the data is the International Convention for The 
Prevention of Pollution of The Sea by Oil which entered into force in 1958 and has been 
ratified by 71 countries.2 Since then, another 41 agreements were formed to examine 
2 Following recent empirical research on MEAs (Egger et al., 2011, 2013; Millimet and Roy, 2014), we 
only focus on those recent pollution agreements which were formed after the World War II. In addition, 
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various pollution issues which can be categorized into three groups: air pollution, marine 
pollution, and waste pollution (Ronald Mitchell, 2016). The number of signatories of 
these agreements varies from 3 to 196. Figure 1 shows the annual count of the number of 
pollution agreements over time.  
There are a large number of game-theoretic papers exploring the formation and 
characteristics of international environmental agreements (e.g. Barrett, 1994, 1997, 2001; 
Carraro and Siniscalo, 1993, 1998; Hoel, 1992; Hoel and Schneider, 1997; Rubio and 
Ulph, 2003; Finus et al 2005). Their basic findings suggest that the number of countries 
in an agreement is likely to be very small and that self-enforcing international 
environmental agreements with a large number of signatories may not be able to improve 
substantially beyond what countries can do without any agreements. On the other hand, 
there are a small but growing number of empirical papers on multilateral environmental 
agreements.  Egger et al. (2011, 2013) argue that countries with more liberalized trade 
and investment policies tend to ratify more multilateral environmental agreements. 
Besedes et al. (2016) examine the economic determinants of countries’ cooperation on 
multilateral environmental agreements. They find that economic size, distance, and 
economic integration variables contribute to countries’ coordination. 
there are three types of agreements in the IEA database: main agreements, protocols, and amendments. We 
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Apart from previous research, we employ duration analysis to examine countries’ 
cooperation on pollution treaties. Our goal is to examine the economic factors that 
influence how long it takes two countries to sign their first agreement as well as any 
subsequent ones. Specifically, we first examine how long it takes two countries to have 
an MEA since 1950. After having an MEA or a set of them, most countries continue to 
cooperate on other environmental treaties in the following years. To understand this 
process, we then examine how long it takes two countries to have another agreement 
conditional upon having already had a number of them. Why is the examination of 
having an additional agreement important? Unlike trade agreements which are always 
comprehensive such as The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an environmental agreement 
often focuses on a specific environmental issue. For example, the Kyoto Protocol is used 
to control the emission of CO2, while the Basel Convention deals with the international 
movement of hazardous wastes. As a result, two countries often have only one trade 
agreement but have a number of environmental agreements. In addition, as we know, the 
implementation of environmental agreements, especially those pollution related, incur 
economic costs. After ratifying an agreement, countries may wait and see whether and 
how costly it is. If the cost is much larger than the benefit, countries may wait a longer 
time to ratify another one or never try again. As a result, it is interesting to examine 
countries’ decisions to have an additional agreement. 
 In our context, the hazard rate refers to the likelihood of two countries having an 
agreement in a certain year conditional upon not having had one until that year or the 
probability of having another agreement conditional upon already having some. 
Economic factors of interest to us include economic size, distance, and economic 
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integration levels the role of which is examined in Besedes et al. (2016) to examine the 
likelihood of countries having an agreement as well as the number of agreements they 
have. 
Our econometric method is motivated by Hess and Persson (2012) in which the 
authors use discrete-time models to replicate the influential study of the duration of trade 
by Besedes and Prusa (2006). They show that discrete-time models, especially the 
random-effects probit model, are more suitable than the traditional Cox proportional 
hazards models in analyzing duration of trade flow, as the Cox model was developed 
with continuous-time data in mind. Because of the similar structure of our data and trade 
duration data, we also employ random-effects probit model to examine the timing of 
MEAs. This model has three advantages compared to Cox models: 1) it can deal with tied 
duration times; 2) it can more easily account for unobserved heterogeneity; and 3) it is 
not restricted by the proportional hazards assumption. The complementary log-log model, 
which is used to examine the timing of free trade agreement (Bergstrand et al., 2016), 
also assumes that the hazards of two subjects are proportional to each other and is thus 
less desirable of an approach. 
Our results show that economic size, distance, existence of a trade agreement, and 
trade flows shift the hazard of two countries having their first agreement or another one. 
Countries without any agreement become more likely to sign one as time passes. In other 
words, conditional on not having an agreement, the hazard of signing the first agreement 
is increasing with duration. However, this effect changes if the two countries have an 
agreement. In that case, the hazard of signing an additional agreement is decreasing with 
duration. This effect is at least partially offset the greater the number of pollution 
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agreements two countries have. By comparing the estimated hazards, we further show 
that the likelihood of having an addition agreement conditional on already having had 
some is much larger than the likelihood of having the first agreement. This result 
indicates that countries’ previous experience on environmental cooperation may 
contribute to their future cooperation. 
 4.2 Econometric Model 
We employ a discrete-time duration analysis to examine the timing of countries’ 
cooperation on pollution related agreements. Depending on the characteristics of the data 
generating process or the available data, duration analysis employs either continuous-
time analysis or discrete-time analysis. We focus on discrete-time analysis using the 
random effects probit estimator for several reasons. First, we can only observe the 
number of years until two countries have another agreement which means that our data 
have been grouped into discrete intervals of time (years). Second, many observations in 
our data have the same duration when a failure occurs (“ties”), which in our application is 
when the two countries sign an agreement. Third, discrete-time analysis can easily 
address unobserved heterogeneity. Fourth, the venerable Cox semiparametric hazard 
model assumes that the hazard of any two subjects is proportional to each other at any 
point during the duration of the spells of the two subjects. This assumption does not allow 
for the ratio of the two hazards to change with duration. This restriction is alleviated by 
our use of the random effects probit estimator. 
 Following Jenkins (2005), it is easy to show that the maximum likelihood 
function for a discrete time duration model and a binary choice model are exactly the 
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same. We assume that the hazard rate for countries  and  to have a pollution agreement 
in year is: 
. (1) 
In our context, this hazard refers to: 1) the probability of two countries having a pollution 
agreement conditional on not having had one until year  ; and 2) the probability of two 
countries having another pollution agreement conditional on already having had some 
agreements in year . We observe a country pair AB’s spell from the first year to the last 
one, , which is country pair specific. In the last year, , the two countries’ spell is 
either complete ( ), or right censored ( ).  Then, the likelihood contribution 
for a complete spell is 
while the likelihood contribution for a right censored spell is 
The likelihood for the whole sample is 
This implies that 
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Now we define  as the MEA dummy variable. For the spells in which two countries 
have no agreements,  equals to one if two countries have a pollution agreement and 
zero otherwise, while for the spells in which two countries already have some agreements, 
 is equal to one if two countries have another agreement and zero otherwise. When 
the spell is complete ( ),  if , and  otherwise. When the 
spell is right censored ( ),  is always equal to zero. Hence, equation (5) can be 
written as 
which has the exactly same form as the traditional log likelihood function for binary 
response models. 
In order to estimate the model parameters, we have to specify a functional form 
for the hazard rate . Following Hess and Persson (2012), we estimate a discrete 
hazard using random effect probit with the following specification 
where   is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,  is the set of 
explanatory variables and  captures the general time trend. We assume 
where t measures the number of years since the beginning of the spell, while 
measures the random effect. 
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4.3 Data 
Multilateral environmental agreement data come from Ronald Mitchell’s International 
Environmental Agreement Database Project (2002-2016). Basic information on 
multilateral environmental agreements includes subject or topic of the agreement, its 
beginning date, and membership. Treaties are categorized into eight subjects: energy, 
freshwater resources, habitat, nature, oceans, weapons and environment, pollution, and 
species. In addition, agreements dealing with pollution are further divided into four 
categories: pollution related to air, land, ocean, and waste. Member countries and the date 
when those members ratified the agreement are identified in the database. 
Explanatory variables in our specifications mainly come from Besedes et al. 
(2016). There are two sets of explanatory variables: gravity variables and economic 
integration variables. In addition, to explore how the number of MEAs two countries 
already have may affect their probability of having another one, we include the number 
of agreements two countries have during the spell. 
To be more specific, gravity variables include sum of logarithm of GDPs, 
difference of logarithm of GDPs, logarithm of distance between two countries’ economic 
center, common border dummy, and common official language dummy. These gravity 
variables come from the CEPII gravity database. Economic integration variables include 
a trade agreement dummy variable and the value of bilateral trade flows. Since there are 
various types of trade agreements, we attempt to examine how they may affect countries’ 
cooperation on pollution issues differently. Following Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), 
we group EIAs into three types: one-way PTAs, two-way PTAs and FTAs and deeper 
integration agreements (including custom unions, common markets, and economic 
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unions). Data on trade agreements are from the Database on Economic Integration 
Agreements compiled by Scott Baier and Jeff rey Bergstrand (2007). Bilateral trade flow 
data are aggregated from 4-digit SITC UN Comtrade data. 
4.4 Results 
We first examine the economic factors that shift the hazards of having the first agreement 
or another one. After obtaining the coefficients, we plot the estimated hazards over time. 
Our results show that economic size, distance, and economic integration variables 
influence the hazards of countries’ cooperation on pollution agreements. In addition, the 
hazard of having an additional agreement is always larger than the hazard of having the 
first one. 
4.4.1 Economic Determinants of Various Hazard Rates 
In this section, we discuss the main empirical results for various hazard rate 
specifications. The first hazard rate specification refers to the probability of having a 
pollution agreement in a certain year conditional on not having had one until that year. 
Since most country pairs in our sample have more than one pollution agreement, we 
examine the probability of having another agreement conditional on already having had 
one. This is the second hazard rate specification. The additional hazard rate specification 
are for instances when countries progressively add more agreements. We explore the 
hazard of signing additional agreements up to the sixth agreement two countries could 
have. In 2005, the last year in our sample, the mean of the number of agreements two 
countries have is 4.14, the median is 4, and the third quartile is 5. The minimum and 
maximum number is 0 and 20 respectively. After analyzing different hazards separately, 
we pool all the data in our sample and examine the average hazard which can be referred 
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as the probability of having another agreement conditional on having already had some 
(include zero).   
To estimate each of the hazards above, we first only include geographic variables 
such as distance, border, and common language. We then add GDP variables which are 
followed by adding trade agreement variables and trade flow variables. I also include the 
log of time variable in each specification which measures the number of years since the 
beginning of the spell. 
Our main results show that economic size, distance, and trade integration 
variables shift the hazard of two countries having their first agreement or another one. In 
addition, the time variable has a positive effect on the hazard conditional on two 
countries having no agreements before, but the effect changes to be negative if two 
countries already have some agreements and for the pooled regression. Furthermore, the 
more agreements two countries currently have, the sooner they will have another one. In 
other words, the number of agreements has a positive effect on the hazard rate of having 
more agreements. 
Table 4.1 presents the results using geographic variables only. As we can see, 
columns 1 to 7 show the results for hazard rates conditional on different number of 
agreements two countries already have, while column 8 shows the results of the pooled 
regression. In column one, we examine the probability of two countries signing a 
pollution agreement in a certain year conditional on not having had one until that year. As 
we can see, distance has a negative and significant effect on the hazard rate of signing the 
first agreement which implies that closer countries tend to have their first agreement 
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earlier. As argued in Besedes et al. (2016), countries that are closer to each other may 
have more economic and cultural interactions which may facilitate their coordination on 
solving international pollution issues. Our results confirm this argument in a dynamic 
circumstance. Border has a significantly positive effect which means that countries 
sharing a border tend to have their first agreement in a shorter period of time. Common 
language has a negative and significant effect on the hazard rate. Most country pairs 
sharing official language are less developed ones. For example, there are 67 countries 
where English is an official language. However, most of these countries are located in 
less developed areas such as Africa, the Caribbean, or Asia. These countries are relatively 
less industrialized so international pollution issues may not be severe for them especially 
in the early years. The time variable has a positive and significant effect on the hazard 
rate which indicates that the longer two countries have no agreement, the higher the 
probability in any period that it will have one. 
In the second column, we examine the probability of two countries having another 
agreement conditional on already having had one. Distance has a significant positive 
effect. In other tables we can also observe the positive effect of distance for countries that 
already have one MEA. The reason may be as follows. As shown in the first column, 
countries closer to each other often have their first agreement in a short period of time 
after 1950. Many country pairs had their first agreement in the 1960s or the 1970s. 
However, most of pollution agreements entered into force in the 1990s. It is very possible 
that some countries closer to each other had their first agreement in the 1960s and a 
second set in the 1980s, while some distant countries had both their first and second 
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agreements in the 1990s. This may explain why we observe unusual effects for distance.  
This reasoning may also apply for common language which has a positive effect. 
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Table 4.1 Gravity variables without GDPs 

















DISTANCE -0.109*** 0.0863*** -0.114*** -0.148*** -0.150*** -0.128*** -0.156*** -0.0496*** 
(0.00539) (0.00777) (0.00834) (0.00999) (0.0112) (0.0285) (0.0170) (0.00267) 
BORDER 0.127*** 0.136*** -0.128*** -0.105* -0.0604 -0.0947 -0.133 0.0326* 
(0.0349) (0.0478) (0.0490) (0.0570) (0.0655) (0.0815) (0.0991) (0.0168) 
COMMON LANGUAGE -0.129*** 0.0462*** -0.0783*** -0.0784*** 0.00717 0.0285 -0.0680* -0.0480*** 
(0.0103) (0.0148) (0.0164) (0.0196) (0.0243) (0.0306) (0.0382) (0.00537) 
ln_t 1.361*** -0.0786*** -0.0475*** -0.114*** -0.0997*** -0.0736 -0.110*** -0.118*** 
(0.0222) (0.00620) (0.00754) (0.00920) (0.0112) (0.0993) (0.0189) (0.00188) 
MEA 0.132*** 
(0.00108) 
Constant -5.832*** -1.554*** 0.153** 0.296*** 0.306*** 0.0362 0.292** -1.139*** 
(0.0807) (0.0698) (0.0741) (0.0884) (0.0988) (0.173) (0.148) (0.0243) 
Observations 1,104,806 70,772 61,379 51,828 34,363 23,665 14,137 1,378,944 
Number of country pairs 24,624 13,830 13,237 11,624 7,453 5,121 3,185 83,166 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The time variable has a negative effect. As we can see, the time variable has a 
negative effect on the hazard if two countries already have some agreements. The 
possible reason is as follows. There are some large agreements (three of them with more 
than 150 signatories) including almost all the countries in the world entered into force in 
the early 1990s. As mentioned before, the mean of MEA is four. So it is possible that 
after agreeing to such large agreements many countries just do not cooperate on MEAs 
anymore. This may be one reason that can explain the negative effect of time. 
We present the results for countries already having had two agreements in column 
three. As we can see, most variables have the expected signs again. Both distance and 
common language have negative and significant effects. The time variable also has a 
negative effect. Different from results in the first two columns, the effect of border also 
changes to be negative. In column four, we examine how long it takes two countries to 
have another agreement conditional on them already having three agreements. Similar 
with what we have in column three, distance, common language, and the time variable 
have a negative effect on the hazard rate. We present the results for the countries that 
have already had four agreements in column five. Only distance and common language 
have significantly negative effect. The effect of border and language is insignificant. 
Similar results are also found in column six and seven. The results indicate that 
conditional on having a relatively large number of agreements (more than four) only 
distance matters for the hazard of having another one. 
In the last column, we pooled all the observations together and control for the 
number of agreements they already have. Distance and common language have a 
significantly negative effect. The effect of the time variable is also negative. The variable 
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MEA has a positive effect on the hazard (the same for other tables). It implies that 
countries with more environmental agreements are more likely to have another one in the 
following period. The reason may be that the more agreements they have the more 
familiar they become with the procedure of negotiation. So they can cooperate on 
environmental issues much faster. 
In Table 4.2, we add GDP variables in our regressions. The sum of GDPs always 
has a positive effect on the hazard and the difference of GDPs has a negative effect 
except for column 2. Economically large countries tend to have more economic 
interactions with each other after controlling for other factors which may promote their 
cooperation on environmental issues. As a result, we expect that the sum of GDPs should 
have a positive effect on the hazard. Except for the results in column 2, the sum of GDPs 
always has a positive effect. Conditional on already having one MEA, the effect of GDPs 
on having another agreement is negative. The possible reason is that economically larger 
countries often have their first agreement in early years like 1960s or 1970s. However, 
most pollution agreements enter into force in 1990s. These relatively large countries may 
wait for a longer time to have their second agreement. On the other hand, countries with 
small economic sizes may have both their first and second agreement in 1990s, so the 
length of time between the first and second agreements is shorter for the small countries. 
In Tables 4.3 and 4.4, we add a trade agreement dummy and different types of trade 
agreements. As we can see, in general, a trade agreement has a positive effect on the 
hazard and deeper economic integration has a larger effect on hazard than one-way or 
two-way PTAs. In Table 4.5, we add a trade flow variable and it also has a positive effect 
on the hazard.  
94 
Table 4.2 Gravity variables with GDPs 

















SUM_GDP 0.0426*** -0.0434*** 0.0244*** 0.0662*** 0.0317*** 0.0588*** 0.0456*** 0.0163*** 
(0.00192) (0.00190) (0.00196) (0.00244) (0.00292) (0.0182) (0.00448) (0.000754) 
DIFF_GDP -0.00928*** 0.0258*** -0.00131 -0.0128*** 0.00768* 0.0361** 0.0216*** 0.0125*** 
(0.00234) (0.00304) (0.00321) (0.00375) (0.00449) (0.0146) (0.00685) (0.00118) 
DISTANCE -0.133*** 0.0935*** -0.0876*** -0.127*** -0.133*** -0.270*** -0.161*** -0.0678*** 
(0.00686) (0.00874) (0.00905) (0.0106) (0.0117) (0.0848) (0.0177) (0.00322) 
BORDER -0.184*** 0.203*** -0.0637 -0.190*** -0.0796 -0.224 -0.171* -0.0960*** 
(0.0389) (0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0582) (0.0663) (0.166) (0.0998) (0.0181) 
COMMON LANGUAGE -0.0589*** 0.0344** -0.109*** 0.0251 0.0468* 0.143** 0.00578 -0.0312*** 
(0.0124) (0.0164) (0.0172) (0.0205) (0.0252) (0.0700) (0.0393) (0.00636) 
ln_t 1.635*** -0.0417*** -0.0313*** -0.107*** -0.0983*** 0.455 -0.116*** -0.181*** 
(0.0256) (0.00695) (0.00797) (0.00950) (0.0116) (0.326) (0.0192) (0.00224) 
MEA 0.0224*** 
(0.00135) 
Constant -7.014*** -0.841*** -0.494*** -1.151*** -0.487*** -0.605** -0.697*** -0.753*** 
(0.114) (0.0865) (0.0901) (0.106) (0.118) (0.281) (0.179) (0.0328) 
Observations 392,960 58,329 53,640 49,076 31,993 22,903 13,749 640,439 
Number of country pairs 18,337 12,115 12,089 10,978 7,100 5,001 3,137 72,836 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3 Gravity variable with EIA 

















SUM_GDP 0.0584*** -0.0476*** 0.0295*** 0.0720*** 0.0313*** 0.0482*** 0.0405*** 0.0107*** 
(0.00273) (0.00199) (0.00211) (0.00259) (0.00308) (0.0133) (0.00471) (0.000794) 
DIFF_GDP -0.0239*** 0.0212*** 0.00158 -0.00872** 0.00675 0.0262** 0.0152** 0.00442*** 
(0.00279) (0.00314) (0.00330) (0.00387) (0.00465) (0.0121) (0.00710) (0.00122) 
DISTANCE -0.127*** 0.104*** -0.107*** -0.147*** -0.135*** -0.237*** -0.145*** -0.0492*** 
(0.00844) (0.00890) (0.00931) (0.0109) (0.0120) (0.0633) (0.0184) (0.00334) 
BORDER -0.219*** 0.219*** -0.0649 -0.193*** -0.0998 -0.176 -0.166* -0.0895*** 
(0.0452) (0.0519) (0.0523) (0.0587) (0.0666) (0.152) (0.0997) (0.0184) 
COMMON LANGUAGE -0.0502*** 0.0209 -0.111*** 0.0277 0.0432* 0.124** -0.000421 -0.0396*** 
(0.0141) (0.0164) (0.0174) (0.0206) (0.0252) (0.0614) (0.0393) (0.00646) 
TRADE AGREEMENT 0.0303** 0.0988*** -0.106*** -0.0880*** 0.0153 0.147*** 0.112*** 0.131*** 
(0.0143) (0.0154) (0.0162) (0.0181) (0.0208) (0.0510) (0.0309) (0.00619) 
ln_t 1.846*** -0.0419*** -0.0200** -0.104*** -0.0991*** 0.386 -0.117*** -0.178*** 
(0.0388) (0.00699) (0.00807) (0.00957) (0.0116) (0.245) (0.0192) (0.00226) 
MEA 0.0116*** 
(0.00138) 
Constant -8.008*** -0.854*** -0.404*** -1.073*** -0.456*** -0.619** -0.761*** -0.777*** 
(0.161) (0.0871) (0.0910) (0.107) (0.119) (0.264) (0.180) (0.0334) 
Observations 347,688 57,596 52,890 48,748 31,895 22,847 13,745 593,190 
Number of country pairs 17,228 12,030 11,999 10,946 7,079 4,993 3,136 71,488 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.4 Gravity variables with various EIAs 

















SUM_GDP 0.0607*** -0.0445*** 0.0263*** 0.0691*** 0.0318*** 0.0541*** 0.0437*** 0.0139*** 
(0.00269) (0.00196) (0.00204) (0.00253) (0.00299) (0.0175) (0.00459) (0.000781) 
DIFF_GDP -0.0233*** 0.0265*** -0.00179 -0.0119*** 0.00865* 0.0346** 0.0197*** 0.00903*** 
(0.00277) (0.00311) (0.00326) (0.00383) (0.00458) (0.0143) (0.00700) (0.00121) 
DISTANCE -0.129*** 0.123*** -0.108*** -0.148*** -0.131*** -0.243*** -0.151*** -0.0447*** 
(0.00874) (0.00937) (0.0101) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0816) (0.0198) (0.00357) 
BORDER -0.203*** 0.172*** -0.0516 -0.184*** -0.117* -0.195 -0.179* -0.103*** 
(0.0460) (0.0524) (0.0527) (0.0593) (0.0673) (0.157) (0.1000) (0.0186) 
COMMON LANGUAGE -0.0542*** 0.0145 -0.115*** 0.0279 0.0436* 0.129* 0.00329 -0.0382*** 
(0.0143) (0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0207) (0.0253) (0.0661) (0.0393) (0.00647) 
OWPTA -0.000325 0.0254 -0.0678*** -0.0626*** -0.00843 0.0372 0.0725* 0.0846*** 
(0.0188) (0.0206) (0.0217) (0.0240) (0.0270) (0.0440) (0.0374) (0.00836) 
TWPTA -0.0796** 0.221*** -0.184*** -0.178*** -0.104* -0.0250 0.157* 0.115*** 
(0.0340) (0.0375) (0.0374) (0.0469) (0.0572) (0.130) (0.0802) (0.0149) 
FTA_deeper 0.244*** 0.365*** -0.0300 -0.0364 0.117** 0.139* 0.0466 0.188*** 
(0.0591) (0.0494) (0.0419) (0.0438) (0.0460) (0.0831) (0.0555) (0.0147) 
ln_t 1.855*** -0.0406*** -0.0226*** -0.106*** -0.0986*** 0.396 -0.116*** -0.179*** 
(0.0384) (0.00700) (0.00806) (0.00956) (0.0116) (0.313) (0.0192) (0.00227) 
MEA 0.0104*** 
(0.00142) 
Constant -8.060*** -1.087*** -0.330*** -1.008*** -0.510*** -0.680** -0.760*** -0.870*** 
(0.163) (0.0922) (0.0988) (0.116) (0.126) (0.287) (0.192) (0.0354) 
Observations 345,113 57,596 52,890 48,747 31,894 22,846 13,745 590,611 
Number of country pairs 17,226 12,030 11,999 10,945 7,079 4,993 3,136 71,485 
Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5 Gravity variables with EIA and trade 

















SUM_GDP 0.0420*** -0.0438*** 0.0302*** 0.0684*** 0.0260*** 0.0481*** 0.0539*** 0.00136 
(0.00273) (0.00242) (0.00262) (0.00320) (0.00382) (0.0116) (0.00610) (0.000937) 
DIFF_GDP -0.0235*** 0.0205*** 0.00150 -0.00854** 0.00713 0.0217** 0.0143** 0.00519*** 
(0.00280) (0.00315) (0.00330) (0.00387) (0.00466) (0.0102) (0.00711) (0.00122) 
DISTANCE -0.117*** 0.101*** -0.107*** -0.143*** -0.132*** -0.208*** -0.161*** -0.0424*** 
(0.00841) (0.00896) (0.00938) (0.0111) (0.0121) (0.0520) (0.0189) (0.00336) 
BORDER -0.225*** 0.220*** -0.0651 -0.194*** -0.102 -0.160 -0.175* -0.0896*** 
(0.0451) (0.0519) (0.0523) (0.0587) (0.0666) (0.129) (0.0999) (0.0184) 
COMMON LANGUAGE -0.0793*** 0.0261 -0.110*** 0.0223 0.0342 0.117** 0.00885 -0.0532*** 
(0.0142) (0.0165) (0.0175) (0.0208) (0.0255) (0.0522) (0.0394) (0.00651) 
TRADE AGREEMENT -0.0433*** 0.107*** -0.104*** -0.0961*** 0.00496 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.102*** 
(0.0148) (0.0157) (0.0167) (0.0186) (0.0213) (0.0454) (0.0317) (0.00639) 
SUM TRADE 0.0121*** -0.00176*** -0.000332 0.00155* 0.00217** -0.00285* -0.00523*** 0.00503*** 
(0.000632) (0.000647) (0.000736) (0.000813) (0.000912) (0.00161) (0.00151) (0.000267) 
ln_t 1.881*** -0.0405*** -0.0198** -0.106*** -0.100*** 0.234 -0.108*** -0.180*** 
(0.0404) (0.00701) (0.00809) (0.00960) (0.0116) (0.206) (0.0194) (0.00227) 
MEA 0.00495*** 
(0.00143) 
Constant -7.977*** -0.887*** -0.410*** -1.046*** -0.404*** -0.639*** -0.820*** -0.683*** 
(0.164) (0.0880) (0.0921) (0.108) (0.121) (0.226) (0.181) (0.0337) 
Observations 347,688 57,596 52,890 48,748 31,895 22,847 13,745 593,190 
Number of country pairs 17,228 12,030 11,999 10,946 7,079 4,993 3,136 71,488 
Standard errors in parentheses and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 4.4.2 Fitted Hazard Rates Over Time 
In this section, we present the plots of the estimated hazard rates over time. We 
first discuss the fitted hazards generated by using all pollution agreements which is 
followed by the discussion of the fitted hazards of small agreements and large ones 
separately. We use the specification in Table 4.3, which includes gravity and trade 
agreement variables, to calculate all the estimated hazard rates. Our results show that the 
hazard of having the first agreement increases over time, and the hazard of having 
another agreement conditional on already having some decreases over time. The hazard 
of having an additional agreement (2nd, 3rd, and etc.) is always larger than the hazard of 
having the first one. 
In Figure 4.3, we plot the fitted hazards of having the first agreement with solid 
line and the fitted hazard of having the second one with a dashed line. We focus on the 
hazard of signing an agreement over a period of 20 years. As we can see, the estimated 
hazard of having the first agreement increases over time, while the estimated hazard of 
having the second one decreases over time. The results indicate that conditional on 
having no agreement the longer two countries wait the more likely they are to sign an 
agreement. And after they already have one agreement, the longer they wait the less 
likely they are to have another one. As we discussed before, pollution agreements are 
often costly and the realization of true economic costs of implementing an agreement 
takes time, the longer they wait the less likely they would cooperate on an additional one. 
Another point worth mentioning is that the level of the hazard of having the second 
































Figure 4.4 Fitted Hazard of Having 3rd, 4th, and 5th Agreements
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We plot the fitted hazards of having the third, fourth, and fifth agreements for a 
period 20 years in Figure 4.4. In general, the hazards decrease over time, indicating that 
the longer the countries wait to sign another agreement, the less likely they are to sign it. 
The magnitude of the hazard of the third agreement is larger than that of the fourth and 
fifth agreement. The overlapped confidence intervals indicate that we cannot clearly 
distinguish the level of the hazards of having the fourth and fifth one. To have a better 
idea on the magnitudes of various hazards, we calculate the average estimated hazards in 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 over time in Table 6. The first column shows the average values of 
various hazards in 20 years, while the second and third columns show the average values 
in the first and second 10 years respectively. In general, after having a number of 
agreements the hazard of having another one is always higher than the hazard of having 
the first agreement. In addition, the hazards of having the second and third ones are larger 
than that of having the fourth and fifth. 
Table 6 Average Fitted Hazard 







1st Agreement 0.02166915 0.0058932 0.0374451 
2nd Agreement 0.1989896 0.2139233 0.1840559 
3rd Agreement 0.18922105 0.1912714 0.1871707 
4th Agreement 0.10274305 0.1149676 0.0905185 
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Figure 4.6 Fitted Hazards of Having the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Agreement Based on Size
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In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we examine the pollution agreements based on the number of 
signatories they have. Specifically, we focus on the agreements with less than 20 
signatories, 80 signatories, and 100 signatories and those with more than 20, 80, and 100 
signatories. Figure 4.5 shows the estimated hazards of having the first and second 
agreements and Figure 6 show the estimated hazards of having third, fourth, and fifth 
ones. In Figure 4.5, the hazard of having the first small agreement is much lower than the 
hazard of having a large one which indicates that countries may incur fewer economic 
costs when they cooperate on large agreements than small ones. The environmental 
agreements with a large number of signatories are often symbolic and do not have 
binding commitments. So the costs of implementing large agreements tend to be small 
and countries may be more likely to cooperate on such agreements.  Similar to our 
previous results, the hazard of having an additional agreement is always larger than the 
hazard of having the first one no matter whether the agreements are large or small. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we explore the economic determinants of timing of pollution related 
agreements. Specifically, we examine how long it takes two countries to have their first 
pollution agreement since 1950 and how long it takes them to have another agreement 
conditional on already having had some. The pollution agreement data used in our 
analysis mainly address air pollution, marine pollution, and waste pollution and they are 
from Ronald Mitchell’s International Environmental Agreement Database Project (2002-
2016). Following the method developed by Hess and Persson (2012), we employ a 
discrete-time duration model to examine the hazard of two countries’ cooperation on 
pollution agreements in the period 1950 to 2005. We focus on all the pollution 
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agreements in our sample, as well as the agreements with a small number of signatories 
and those with a large number of signatories. 
Our results show that economic size, distance, and trade integration variables shift 
the hazard of two countries having their first agreement or another one. In addition, the 
time variable has a positive effect on the hazard conditional on two countries having no 
agreements before, but the effect changes to be negative if two countries already have 
some agreements. Furthermore, countries’ likelihood of cooperating on an additional 
agreement is much larger than the likelihood of having their first one. In the future, we 
will examine the timing of pollution agreements addressing a certain type of polluting 
issue such as air pollution. Also, we can divide all agreements into regional pollution 
agreements and global pollution agreements, and separately examine the timing of these 
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